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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

DANNY LEE JOHNSON,

;

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870096

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted criminal
homicide—murder in the first degree, a first degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(k) (Supp. 1986), and of
being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978), following a trial in Third
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Raymond Uno, Judge, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction in

this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-3(h) (1987) and Utah Code
Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support

defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder.
2.

Whether defendant's prior convictions for theft by

deception and theft were properly admitted under Utah R. Evid.
609 for purposes of impeachment.
3.

Whether Trooper Bringhurst's Utah Highway Patrol

uniform was relevant to the issues presented in the case and

whether the probative value of the uniform outweighed any
prejudicial effect.
4.

Whether the testimony of Jean Hickam concerning her

telephone conversation with defendant on May 26, just hours
before defendant shot the trooper, was relevant to the issues
presented in the case.
5.

Whether Officer Vern Olsen's statement that he was

on guard duty at the hospital four days after the shooting was so
prejudicial that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
6.

Whether the trial court should have formally

declared Lt. Fallows a hostile witness and should have allowed
defense counsel to ask leading questions during the entirety of
her direct examination, and whether defendant was prejudiced as a
result of the trial court's ruling.
7.

Whether following an attack on Trooper Bringhurst's

credibility as a witness, the trial court properly allowed
evidence of his truthfulness.
8.

Whether questions asked by two jurors during the

course of the trial in open court constituted "early
deliberation" and, if so, whether defendant was denied due
process thereby.
9.

Whether the trial court properly denied defense

counsel's motion to withdraw or for mistrial in order to allow
her to testify to allegedly inconsistent—although
insignificant—statements made to her by Det. Imig.
10.

Whether there was "cumulative error" upon which

this Court should reverse defendant's conviction.
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11.

Whether defendant can be convicted of being an

habitual criminal when the foundational crime upon which it is
based is attempted first degree murder.
12.

Whether the documents admitted during the habitual

criminal trial, which state that defendant was represented by
counsel during his previous guilty pleas, were sufficient to
establish a presumption that the pleas were voluntary, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
13.

Whether defendant's prior convictions were

sufficient that he had been "twice convicted" of felony offenses
and that one of those was at least a felony of the second degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Danny Lee Johnson, was convicted by a jury
of one count of attempted criminal homicide—murder in the first
degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(k) (Supp.
1986); he was then convicted following a bench trial of being an
habitual criminal in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001
(1978).

After defendant was convicted on the above counts, the

prosecution moved to dismiss the charge of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (Count II of the
information).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 27, 1986, Trooper Dennis Bringhurst, the victim
of the attempted murder in this case, was on duty, dressed in his
Utah Highway Patrol uniform and driving a clearly marked patrol
car (R. 1395-99).

His shift began on May 26 at 10 p.m. and was,

at the outset, routine and uneventful (R. 1396, 1400-01).
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At

about 1:00 a.m., he was driving north on the Interstate 15
"collector" (the 21st-13th-9th South access system) at 17th South
when he observed defendant's older model Ford (R. 1402, 1405).
As defendant approached the 13th South off-ramp, he suddenly
veered from his position in the right lane, across the left lane,
and through the gore area of the roadway, in order to get to the
13th South off-ramp (R. 1403).

Trooper Bringhurst followed

defendant down the 13th South off-ramp and when defendant got to
the semaphore at 13th South, he stopped his car (R. 1406).
Trooper Bringhurst pulled alongside defendant's car to the left
(R. 1406).

Defendant sat through a full light cycle (red, green,

yellow, and red) before he finally made his right turn onto 13th
South to go east (R. 1407).

At trial, defendant attempted to

explain his unusual behavior by claiming that since he was
driving under the influence, he was waiting for the trooper to
decide whether he was going to stop him (R. 949-50).
Defendant proceeded east on 13th South to 3rd West,
where drove into the left turn lane and again stopped at a red
light (R. 1408).

Trooper Bringhurst pulled up along the right

.side of defendant's car (R. 1409).

Defendant's window was down,

and Trooper Bringhurst looked over at defendant and asked whether
he had been drinking (R. 1409).

Trooper Bringhurst could not

discern defendant's response (R. 1409); defendant testified at
trial that he had answered, MyesM (R. 950). Trooper Bringhurst
directed defendant to make his turn and pull over (R. 1409).
Defendant turned left onto 3rd West and began to pull off to the
side of the road, but changed his mind (R. 1411).

-4-

Third West is

a highly travelled thoroughfare (R. 1053).

He drove north until

he reached Paxton Avenue (1180 South), a quiet side street (R.
1417, 1053).

Although

the area was well-lit by street lights,

the street was still quite dark (R. 1417, 1053).

Defendant

stopped his car while still in the lane of travel (R. 1415).
Trooper Bringhurst pulled behind defendant in an offset
position used routinely for traffic stops (R. 1415).

With his

emergency lights flashing, his uniform plainly in view, and his
flashlight in his hand, Trooper Bringhurst nonchalantly
approached defendant's car window (R. 1414, 1423, 1425).
As he approached the window, Trooper Bringhurst stated,
"Did you say you have been drinking?" (R. 1426.)

Defendant

reached to his right, raised a sawed-off shotgun across his lap,
and, with a grin on his face, he stated, "It doesn't make any
difference, does it?" (R. 1426).

He fired point blank at the

officer (R. 1427-28, 1435).
Upon seeing the gun appear from the dark seat, Trooper
Bringhurst immediately threw himself backward, with his feet
still planted on the ground (R. 1427, 1432).

He heard the

shotgun blast and saw a very bright light (R. 1427-28).

Although

he felt nothing at the time, he had been hit on the right side of
his face with some of the pellets fired from the round (R. 1428,
1437).
As Trooper Bringhurst threw himself backward, he
reached for his sidearm, which caused his head to move slightly
to the left (R. 1432).

Had he not moved, he would have been hit

directly in the chest area with the blast (R. 1432).
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Instead he

was hit on the right side of his head (R. 1437).

He fired in

return; as he put it, it was almost like his body had been given
a command (R. 1429, 753-54, Defense exhibit 70). When Trooper
Bringhurst was hit, he initially did not feel anything; he does
not remember hitting the ground (R. 1428).
shots he fired (R. 1429, 1433).

He heard all five

He was not able to see as he

fired his first four shots (R. 1429).

The only time he could see

was during his fifth and final shot, and then he was able to
observe only defendant's profile as he fired (R. 1429-30).
Trooper Bringhurst did not fire his 6th and last round from his
service revolver (R. 1091, 1439).

Two of the shots fired struck

defendant; one grazed his cheek and the other struck him in the
left flank (R. 944-45).
Officer Ralph Evans, Salt Lake City Police Department,
was nearby when he heard gunfire (R. 1218).

Officer Evans had

travelled west on 13th South and had turned to go north on 3rd
West when he heard the shots (R. 1218).

He immediately drove

toward the very loud sound of the shots (R. 1219, 1221).

As he

drove past Paxton Avenue, he looked to his right and saw two cars
on the road; one was a patrol car with its emergency lights
activated (R. 1219).

He stopped, backed up, and turned onto

Paxton Avenue (R. 1220).

He saw an officer, not at that time

recognizing which police agency he represented, standing near
defendant's car firing rounds (R. 1220).

Officer Evans heard all

six shots fired (defendant's shotgun blast and the trooper's five
shots); he actually saw only the last three shots fired (R.
1220).

He observed the trooper standing and falling to the
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ground in one continuous motion as he fired the last three shots
(R. 1221, 1254).

Officer Evans was unable to distinguish the

types of weapon from which the shots were fired, but stated there
was a brief lapse between the first gunshot and the subsequent
five shots (R. 1222).
Officer Evans could not recall whether defendant's car
door was open or closed (R. 1223).

He initially could not see

anyone in defendant's vehicle, but then saw defendant raise up
into the drivers seat and speed off (R. 1223).

By the time

Officer Evans got to the vehicles, Trooper Bringhurst had
returned to his car and was using his police radio (R. 1223-24).
Trooper Bringhurst motioned him on, and Officer Evans pursued
defendant as he drove eastbound (R. 1224) At the end of the
street, defendant made a wide left turn after crossing railroad
tracks on an embankment in the road (R. 1225).

He lost control

of his car, and crashed into a fence (R. 1225).

Officer Evans

stopped behind him and observed defendant exit the passenger side
of the car (R. 1229).

Officer Evans drew his shotgun and ordered

defendant to stop (R. 1229).

Defendant turned around twice, as

if looking for a place to run, and then fled (R. 1229).

Officer

Evans returned his shotgun to his car and pursued defendant as he
ran down a dark alley (R. 1230-31).

He twice drew his service

revolver and ordered defendant to stop, but he did not (R. 1231).
Defendant ran through a backyard of a residence and attempted to
climb a chain link fence (R. 1231).
to apprehend him (R. 1232).

Officer Evans was then able

Defendant struggled with the officer

and had to be forcibly subdued and handcuffed (R. 1233).
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During

the struggle, defendant repeatedly told Officer Evans

that he

had the wrong man, and that Kelly Gardner (who was wanted for
escape) was the one who had shot the trooper (R. 1243, 1047).
Officer Fowler arrived to assist Officer Evans, and they took
defendant back to the scene (R. 1242).

Defendant was taken by

ambulance to the hospital for treatment of his wounds (R. 1242).
Sgt. George Vaughn, a 15-year veteran police officer
with Salt Lake City Police Department, was a short distance away
from the location of the shooting (R. 1288).

He was standing

outside his car at the city gas pumps located at 8th South and
3rd West when he heard the shots (R. 1289).

There was no noise

at the time to interfere with his ability to hear (R. 1294).
Sgt. Vaughn testified that he heard the distinct sound of a
shotgun blast; the blast was then followed by five or six shots
from a revolver (R. 1289).

He recognized the initial gunshot as

a shotgun blast immediately upon hearing it (R. 1289).

He

described the shotgun blast as a "kaboom," which was followed by
the sharper sounds of a revolver (R. 1290).

He was able to

discern the direction from which the shots came, and immediately
went to the area (R. 1291).

He observed Trooper Bringhurst

sitting in his patrol car and immediately requested medical
assistance (R. 1291).
Two weapons were found in defendant's car; a sawed off
shotgun, which he had used to shoot Trooper Bringhurst, and a
loaded .25 automatic handgun (R. 1316, 1322-23).

Even though no

one had seen a second person in defendant's car, based on
defendant's claim that Kelly Gardner, and not he, had shot the
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trooper, numerous officers arrived at the scene and an extensive
search was carried out to rule out the possibility that someone
else was involved (R. 1300-01).
Defendant was struck by two bullets; one grazed his
left cheek, the other struck him in the lower left back (R. 94445).

There were three wounds in close proximity on his back; Dr.

Noyes could not tell whether they were entrance or exit wounds
(R. 944-45).

Trooper Bringhurst could not see because of the

bright light from the shotgun blast so he did not know whether
the door was open or closed (R. 1428-29, 1435); however, it was
obvious that the car door was open during at least part of the
shots (R. 1325).

One bullet struck the kick panel in the lower

portion of the driver's door frame (R. 1325)

Two struck the back

rest of the drivers seat (R. 1326-27), with one of those going
through the passenger seat back rest and into the passenger door
(R. 1327-29).

These three bullets would have necessarily been

fired while the door was open (R. 1325).

One bullet struck the

passenger door window post near the windshield (R. 1330).
Trooper Bringhurst was taken to LDS Hospital, where he
spent the next four days (R. 1441-42).

He had surgery twice,

and, at the time of trial, anticipated additional reconstructive
surgery (R. 1442-43).

He suffered hearing loss, and has

persistent headaches, eye pain, and nightmares (R. 1443).

Dr.

Allred testified that if the shotgun blast had been one-fourth to
one-half an inch to the left, the pellets would have entered the
orbit of his eye, caused extensive injury, and would have in all
probability resulted in death (R. 1187, 1190-91).
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Prior to the incident, defendant was upset and angry
(783-89).

His girlfriend, Missy, had been dating someone else

whose name is Michael Poulton (R. 783). Earlier that evening,
defendant had called his girlfriend's apartment; Jean Hickam
answered the phone (R. 774, 776). Ms. Hickam was previously
defendant's brother's fiance, and recognized defendant's voice on
the telephone (R. 1023, 774, 782). The conversation lasted for
30-45 minutes (R. 782). During the conversation, defendant made
threatening statements directed at Michael Poulton, including
that he was going to beat him up, tear his legs off, and had
explosives and might blow up the apartment building (R. 782-85).
Ms. Hickam could hear guns clicking in the background as
defendant made comments about loading and unloading the guns (R.
786).
Ms. Hickam was extremely reluctant to testify for the
prosecution at trial.

After the phone call from defendant, Ms.

Hickam had called the sheriff's office (R. 787). Deputy Willden
(and several other deputies) responded and he completed a report
(R. 795, 802-03).

Ms. Hickam attempted to neutralize her

previous statements and testified that she may have been
inaccurate in her statement to Deputy Willden made only a short
time after the incident (R. 790-799).

Nevertheless, Ms. Hickam

was sufficiently concerned by defendant's statements, that she
wanted to leave and the officers escorted her and the others from
the apartment (R. 787)

Deputy Willden testified that he felt

very threatened while walking from the apartment (R. 809).
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Ms. Hickam told Deputy Willden that defendant had said
if the police were notified, he had a long rifle with a scope and
plenty of ammunition (R. 805-06).

She told him that defendant

claimed to have a sawed-off shotgun and a .357 magnum (R. 806),
She also told Deputy Willden that defendant had a contract out on
Poulton, and that he was going to tear his legs off and blow his
head off, and referred to Poulton as "dead" (R. 804-05).
Defendant's version of the shooting was basically the
same as Trooper Bringhurst's with respect to the events while
driving to Paxton Avenue (R. 949-51).

Defendant stated that he

sat at the light at the 13th South off-ramp because, since he was
driving under the influence, he knew the trooper was interested
in him so he waited to see whether he was going to be pulled over
(R. 949-50).

He stated that he had eye contact with the trooper

and smiled at him (R. 949). He remembered what had occurred at
the semaphore at 3rd West and 13th South, and stated that when he
was asked if he had been drinking, he had replied, "yes" (R. 95051)
Defendant stated that after he stopped on Paxton
Avenue, Trooper Bringhurst approached his car as he asked if he
had been drinking (R. 954). Defendant stated that his response
was probably affirmative (R. 954). He stated that he turned and
smiled at the trooper, and told him that he was going to hand a
gun out the window (R. 954). He grabbed the shotgun and started
to hand it out (R. 955). The trooper, according to defendant,
immediately went into a crouched position and reached for his gun
(R. 956). Defendant claimed that he let go of the shotgun and
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turned to get out of the car as he asked what was going on (R.
957).

He opened the door and got his left leg out of the car (R.

958).

As he was turning he slipped on some unknown object (R.

958).

He then saw the trooper fire his gun (R. 958). He claimed

that the first shot hit him in the cheek and that the second hit
him in the back (R. 958-59.

This was inconsistent with what he

had told Officer Vern Olson while at the hospital a few days
after the event; he told the officer that he was not hit until
the third shot (R. 1078).
Defendant claimed that he was unable to recall picking
up the gun or shooting the trooper (R. 960). He then got back
into the car, turned on the ignition and drove off (R. 961). He
claimed to have no memory of driving up the road, crossing the
railroad tracks, or getting out of the car (R. 962-63).

He said

he did not recall the police officer chasing him, but remembers
only that he attempted to climb the fence (R. 963). Defendant's
claim at trial was that Trooper Bringhurst show him first and
that somehow, in self-defense, he shot the trooper (R. 692).
Oscar Hendrickson, a retired police officer, armorer
and expert on firearms, testified that he had examined
defendant's Stevens 12 gauge sawed-off shotgun, and found it to
be in good working order (R. 1098-1101, 1107).

Both the barrel

and the stock had been sawed off, and a thong had been placed on
the stock in order to compensate for the shortened stock (R.
1102, 1104).

He testified that it would take a considerable

amount of energy (eleven to fourteen pounds of pull) in order to
operate the weapon (R. 1105).

The single action gun would have
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to be loaded and cocked prior to firing (R. 1103).

The gun

contains a half-cock position, which would prevent accidental
discharge if one's finger slipped from the hammer while cocking
the gun (R. 1108).

Mr. Hendrickson testified that the gun would

have a considerable amount of recoil and would "jump
considerably" when fired (R. 1104).

Sgt. Richard Bergan actually

test fired the gun and found it to have a substantial concussion
and recoil upon discharge (R. 1133).
Defendant explained his possession of the two loaded
firearms by informing the jury about his prior dealings with
Detective Curt Imig at West Valley Police Department (R. 952-53).
Defendant stated that three years earlier he and Imig had entered
an agreement that if defendant were to ever come across any
illegal weapons, he should "acquire those weapons for him and
show them to him" (R. 953). Defendant stated that he had
obtained the weapons at a party earlier that evening from a
friend who gave them to him voluntarily and without compensation
(R. 953, 982). Defendant refused to disclose the name of the
person from whom he obtained the weapons (R. 980).
In rebuttal, Detective Imig testified that he had first
met defendant in 1982 and that defendant had previously provided
the West Valley police (Det. Imig and others) with information
about narcotics and stolen property (R. 838-39).

Defendant had

been specifically instructed that all transactions were to be
conducted in accordance with department guidelines, had to be
"controlled" (set up, tape recorded, or video taped), and
required prior approval by the city attorney (R. 843-44).
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In no

previous transaction had defendant obtained stolen property or
narcotics on his own and turned them over to the police (R. 844).
The department had decided, following an incident with defendant,
to discontinue the relationship with him in 1986; defendant was
not informed of the decision (R. 841). Detective Imig had last
spoken to defendant in 1985 (R. 841).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of
attempted criminal homicide—murder in the first degree (R. 145).
The defendant waived the jury with respect to the finding
required to* invoke the firearm enhancement; the court made the
requisite finding that a firearm was used during the commission
of the crime (R. 725).
The habitual criminal charge was tried to the bench (R.
615).

Ralph Newberg, Records Administrator for the Idaho

Department of Corrections, identified the defendant and provided
foundation for the admission of prison documents (R. 617-18).
Defendant was initially committed to the Idaho prison for first
degree burglary, a felony which carried of term of imprisonment
of not less than one nor more than five years (R. 620). He was
subsequently committed for the crime of escape, which carried a
term of imprisonment of an indeterminate term not to exceed two
years (R. 621). He was again convicted and committed for escape
and also for assault with a deadly weapon (R. 622). The escape
conviction resulted in a term of imprisonment of not to exceed
five years, and the assault conviction resulted in a consecutive
term of imprisonment not to exceed two years (R. 622-23).
Defendant was discharged from the prison on August 21, 1980 (R.
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623).

A certified copy of the judgments for each of the

convictions were admitted (R. 634, Exhibit 1 (See Appendix B)).
Each judgment reflects that defendant was represented by counsel
(Appendix B).

The court found defendant guilty of being an

habitual criminal (R. 646). The prosecution moved to dismiss
Count II, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person
(R. 649, 611).
Defendant was sentenced on Count I, attempted criminal
homicide—murder in the first degree, to five years to life

with

an additional one to five years for the use of a firearm during
the commission of the crime.

The sentence was ordered enhanced

for the habitual criminal conviction, with no specified
additional term of imprisonment.

The court recommended to the

Board of Pardons that defendant serve not less than 25 years in
the Utah State Prison.

(R. 452-55.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The evidence presented was sufficient to establish that
defendant acted knowingly and intentionally when he fired his
sawed-off shotgun point blank at Trooper Bringhurst.

The

evidence, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, established that defendant intended to kill
Trooper Bringhurst.

Only the trooper's evasive action saved him

from almost certain death.

After defendant was pulled over for

being suspected of driving under the influence, the trooper
approached his car and asked if he had been drinking.

Defendant

raised his shotgun across his lap, stated, "It doesn't make any
difference, does it,M and fired directly at Trooper Bringhurst.
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A police officer standing outside a few blocks away heard the
shots and knew that the first shot was a shotgun blast followed
by the sharper cracking sounds of a revolver.

Defendant was

upset and angry that night and had threatened to harm anyone
including police officers if they got in his way of harming
Michael Poulton, a man who was dating defendant's girlfriend.
Although defendant had been drinking and had consumed
sufficient alcohol that his blood alcohol content was .20 percent
at 2 a.m., his conduct and the observations made by others who
observed him established that he was not so intoxicated that he
could not form the intent to commit the crime.
Defendant was previously convicted of, among other
crimes, theft by deception and theft.

These convictions were

properly admitted pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609 because they
involve dishonesty or false statement.
Defendant's intent was the central issue for the jury
to decide.

One of the elements of the crime was that the victim,

Trooper Bringhurst, was a law enforcement officer.

Therefore,

the trooper's uniform, which had dried blood stains on one
shoulder and was not unduly gruesome, was relevant and its
probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.
On May 26, only hours before defendant shot Trooper
Bringhurst, defendant had a telephone conversation with Jean
Hickam.

Defendant was upset and angry during the conversation

and directed specific threats to one Michael Poulton.

He also

stated that he had guns and that he would harm anyone, including
police officers, who stood in his way of carrying out his
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threats.

Ms. Hickam's testimony was relevant to defendant's

intent, the main disputed issue in this case.

The prejudicial

effect of the testimony was outweighed by its significant
probative value.
Officer Vern Olsen testified at trial regarding
statements made by defendant four days after the shooting while
the officer was at the hospital on guard duty; that the jury knew
Olsen was on "guard duty" was not prejudicial and defendant is
not entitled to a new trial.
Lt. Dan Fallows was called as a defense witness.

He

was questioned by both counsel outside the presence of the jury
prior to his actual testimony and, while he had feelings about
the case, did not manifest that he was a "hostile" witness.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow defense counsel to proceed during the entirety
of the direct examination by leading questions.

During the

significant portion of Lt. Fallow's testimony (after background
information was elicited), defense counsel used leading
questions.

Defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced

by the trial court's ruling; he has not made such a claim, much
less a showing of prejudice.
The focus of the defense was to bring out inconsistent
statements, however minor, made by Trooper Bringhurst during his
many previous statements concerning the events surrounding the
shooting.

While these statements viewed separately were

insignificant, their cumulative effect was an attack on the
credibility of Trooper Bringhurst as a witness.
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Because his

credibility had been attacked, evidence of Trooper Bringhurst's
reputation for truthfulness was properly admitted.
During the course of the trial in open court, two
jurors asked questions of the trial court.

Taken in context, the

first juror's question evidenced that he wanted to know whether
he would be required to remember all the details of the evidence
presented at trial.

The court explained that the attorneys would

attempt to piece together the evidence during closing arguments
and that the jury would use its collective memory during
deliberation.

The question by the second juror was not answered

and the jury as a whole was instructed that any questions during
the course of the trial should be made in writing.

This series

of events did not constitute "early deliberation" and deny
defendant a fair trial.
The prosecution called Det. Imig to rebut certain
statements made by defendant concerning the reason he was in
possession of the sawed-off shotgun and .25 automatic on the
night he shot Trooper Bringhurst.

During cross-examination, Det.

Imig allegedly made statements that were inconsistent with his
statements during an earlier telephone conversation with defense
counsel.

Only defense counsel and Det. Imig were parties to the

conversation.

After the conclusion of the evidence, defense

counsel moved to withdraw as counsel or for mistrial so she could
testify regarding her conversation with Det. Imig.

The alleged

impeachment material was insignificant and related to collateral
matters.

The trial court properly denied defendant's motion.
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Defendant was properly convicted of being an habitual
criminal following his conviction for the triggering offense,
attempted first degree murder.

The language of the statute is

clear and unambiguous and does not preclude an attempt to commit
first or second degree murder from being the triggering offense.
Evidence that defendant had previously been "twice
convicted" was admitted in the form of testimony from the
custodian of records for the Idaho Department of Corrections and
the judgments of defendant's prior convictions.

The judgments

reflect that during each of defendant's prior guilty pleas, he
was represented by counsel.

Consequently, in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, the prior pleas are presumed to have
been voluntary.

Defendant presented no evidence that his pleas

were not voluntary.
Defendant's prior convictions include convictions in
Idaho for "burglary in the first degree," escape, a second
escape, and assault with a deadly weapon.

The prior crimes were

sufficient to establish that defendant had been "twice convicted"
of felony offenses, one of which was at least a felony of the
second degree.

Thus, the evidence supports defendant's

conviction for being an habitual criminal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF ATTEMPTED FIRST
DEGREE MURDER.
The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for
attempted criminal homicide—murder in the first degree.
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To

convict a defendant of attempted murder, the State must produce
evidence that would allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to
cause Trooper Bringhurst's death.
(Utah 1986).

State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502

In Dumas, this Court stated that M[i]ntent is an

element that often can be proved only by means of circumstantial
evidence."

^d. at 504 (footnote omitted).
In the present case, the State produced more than

sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant intentionally or knowingly attempted to
cause Trooper Bringhurst's death.

In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d

443, 444 (Utah 1983), this Court stated:
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
In the present case, the evidence, when

viewed as a

whole, overwhelmingly supports the jury's verdict and the verdict
should not be reversed based on insufficiency grounds.
A. The Evidence of Intent to Cause Trooper
Bringhurst's Death is Sufficient.
Defendant's theory of the case was that Trooper
Bringhurst shot first and that he, in an effort to save his life,
returned fire (R. 692). However, when the totality of the
evidence is examined and viewed in its proper context, it becomes
compelling that defendant's version of the incident is inherently
improbable.

The jury obviously chose to disregard a number of

his statements and in convicting defendant as charged, found that
the evidence simply did not support his version of the incident.
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Trooper Bringhurst first observed defendant as they
both drove northbound on the 1-15 collector near 21st South (R.
1402).

He observed defendant drive in an unusual manner when he

changed lanes and drove through the gore area in order to get to
the 13th South off-ramp (R. 1403).

Defendant then stopped at the

semaphore at the bottom of the ramp (R. 1406).

He sat through

the light cycle, again exhibiting unusual driving behavior (R.
1407).

At that point, it appears that defendant was almost

inviting the patrolman to stop him.

He then drove to the traffic

light at 3rd West and 13th South and stopped in the left turn
lane (R. 1408).

When Trooper Bringhurst pulled up alongside him

and asked him if he had been drinking, he replied "yes" (R. 95051, 1409) Again, it appears that defendant was inviting the
trooper to make a traffic stop.
Defendant then drove along 3rd West and almost pulled
over but then continued on (R. 1411).

He testified at trial that

he turned onto Paxton Avenue because he was concerned about
leaving his belongings in his car and that the area would be more
secure (R. 951). However, 3rd West is well lighted and a major
thoroughfare (R. 951, 1053); it would be less likely that his car
would be burglarized on 3rd West than on a secluded side street.
Defendant stated that he expected to be arrested; however, he did
not pull his car off the road, but rather parked in the lane of
travel (R. 1415).

Although there are street lights on Paxton

Avenue, the street is a quiet side street and would provide a
more private area in which to shoot the officer (R. 1417, 1053).
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Trooper Bringhurst parked his patrol car in an offset,
traffic stop position and walked toward defendant's car (R.
1415).

As he approached, he asked defendant if he had said he

had been drinking (R. 1426).

Defendant looked at the trooper

with a smile on his face, raised the sawed-off shotgun over his
lap, and, as he said "It doesn't make any difference, does it,"
he fired point blank (R. 1426-428, 1435).
Trooper Bringhurst unequivocably testified at the
preliminary hearing and at trial (and in multiple statements to
the investigating officers and the Shooting Review Board) that he
immediately threw himself backward in an effort to avoid the
gunfire (R. 1407, 1427, 1432, 486-87).

His feet were planted on

the ground, and he simply threw his body backward.

As he threw

himself backward, he reached for his gun (R. 1432).

He saw the

bright light and heard the explosion of the shotgun blast (R.
1427-28).

He clearly and distinctly remembers this sequence of

events.
Trooper Bringhurst was not totally conscious of the
events that occurred in the next few seconds.

He clearly

remembers hearing the five shots that he fired (R. 1429).

He was

unable to see anything during the first four shots, due to the
bright light, the trauma to his head, and the blood in his eye
(R. 1429-30).

However, on his fifth shot, he was able to focus

on defendant and observe his profile as he fired (R. 1429-30).
Trooper Bringhurst was unable to see whether the door was open or
closed during this sequence of events (R. 1435).

He did not know

that the door had been opened; however, it was clear from the
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bullet holes on the car that the door had been open for at least
three of the five shots.
door kick panel (R. 1325).

One of the bullets struck the driver's
Two struck the back rest of the

drivers seat (they entered on the side) (R. 1326-27).

It appears

that one struck defendant's cheek and then the passenger door
post near the windshield (R. 1330, 945). It appears that the
remaining bullet struck defendant's left flank (R. 944-45).
Defendant's argument that the trooper's testimony is inherently
improbable because he "recalled that the door was closed
throughout the incident (Br. of App. at 13), is a misstatement of
the evidence and is, regardless, without merit.

Trooper

Bringhurst was temporarily blinded by the shotgun blast.

He

could not see anything when he fired his first four shots. He
had some vision during his last shot.

His inability to see did

not make his testimony "inherently improbable."
Officer Evans testified that when he first saw Trooper
Bringhurst, he was on his feet and going to the ground in one
continuous motion (R. 1221, 1254).

During this time, he saw

Trooper Bringhurst fire three shots (R. 1220).

Officer Evans did

not see Trooper Bringhurst approach the car, he did not see
defendant fire the shotgun, he did not see defendant open or
partially exit the door, and he did not see Trooper Bringhurst's
first two shots.

Officer Evans actually saw only the last three

shots (R. 1220).

Trooper Bringhurst does not recall specifically

what he did between his first and fifth shot; he only remembers
hearing the five rounds of his firearm being discharged (R.
1433).

It is possible, and consistent with Officer Evans's
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observations, that after he threw himself backward to avoid the
blast, Trooper Bringhurst attempted to get to his feet, but
because he was unsteady, he fell to the ground.

Officer Evans

saw him on his feet as he was falling to the ground in one motion
(R. 1221, 1224).
Defendant totally ignores a critical portion of the
evidence—evidence which supports Trooper Bringhurst's testimony
and destroys his version of the incident.

Sgt. Vaughn testified

that he heard a shotgun blast followed by five or six reports
from a revolver (R. 1289).

Sgt. Vaughn was standing outside his

patrol car at the city gas pumps located a few blocks away (R.
1289).

As he heard the first shot, he knew it was a shotgun

blast; the subsequent reports had a different sound and he could
tell came from a revolver (R. 1289-90).
Q. (By the prosecutor): Sgt. Vaughn, would
you tell the jury how that first blast
sounded and how it was different from the
subsequent shots?
A. The first blast which I believed at that
time was to be from a shotgun was more like
a — if your kids would describe [it], they
would say "kaboom." It's a lower rumbling
sound. The report from a gun, a revolver, a
handgun or rifle is a sharp crack much
shorter in time span.
(R. 1290.)
Defendant's version of the incident is inherently
improbable.

He stated that after he had been pulled over, and

the trooper was approaching his car, he told him that he was
going to hand a weapon out the window (R. 954). He does not
remember the officer's response, but he "reached across and
grabbed the shotgun" to hand it out the window (R. 955).
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Defendant claims that the trooper jumped back and "went into a
crouch" (R. 956). He claims he was so startled that he let go of
the shotgun.

He then asked the trooper what was wrong, but

received no response (R. 957). He then decided to get out of the
car, despite the fact that the trooper was in a crouched position
and had reached for his gun.

Defendant stated that he opened the

door and put his left leg out, and as he was raising up he
slipped on something but did not know what it was (R. 958). He
claims that Trooper Bringhurst then fired a shot which hit him in
the right cheek (R. 958-59).

Given the fact that Trooper

Bringhurst was crouched down and had drawn his weapon, it seems
extremely unlikely that someone in defendant's position would
attempt to get out of the car.

However, defendant had to offer

an explanation for the door being open, which was obvious as the
result of the location of the bullet holes.

His explanation,

however, was so improbable that the jury chose to disregard it.
Defendant remembers with clarity the details to this
point.
960).

However, he does not remember what happened next (R.
Specifically, he claims not to remember having picked up

the shotgun, cocking it, and firing it at the trooper (R. 960).
The evidence showed that it would take considerable effort to
discharge the weapon.

The trigger pull is 11 to 14 pounds; as

Oscar Hendrickson testified, if a 10 pound bag of sugar were hung
on the trigger, it would not cause the weapon to discharge (R.
1105).

Additionally, Sgt. Bergen test fired the weapon and

testified about the considerable "kick" or recoil the weapon has
upon discharge (R. 1133).

Because the stock of the weapon had
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been sawed off, defendant could not brace the stock against his
shoulder (R. 1102f 1104),

A thong had been attached to the stock

in order to assist in controlling the gun (R. 1104).

It would be

inherently improbable for defendant to remember all events
leading up to discharging the weapon, but be unable to recall
actually picking up the gun, cocking it, and firing it.
Further, defendant's testimony at trial was
inconsistent with his statements made at the time of his
apprehension.

He told Officer Evans that Kelly Gardner, a man

wanted for escape, had shot the trooper, not he (R. 1243, 1047).
However, the physical evidence and the eye-witness testimony did
not support defendant's claim that a second person was present.
Defendant specifically told Evans that he did not shoot the
trooper (R. 1243); if he was in fact unaware that he had shot the
trooper, as he claimed at trial, he obviously would not proclaim
his innocence to the specific act of shooting the trooper to the
first person he saw.
His testimony at trial was also inconsistent with what
he had told Officer Olson while at the hospital only four days
after the event.

Defendant told Officer Olson that he had seen

all five shots and had not been hit until the third shot,
contrary to his trial testimony that he had been hit on the first
shot (R. 1078).
Defendant argues that if he had really wanted to kill
Trooper Bringhurst, he could have easily done so because the
trooper had fired all of his bullets and was lying helplessly on
the ground (Br. of App. 19). However, this is not supported by

the evidence.

Trooper Bringhurst consciously did not fire his

sixth and final shot (R. 1439).

Defendant was likely taken off

guard when Trooper Bringhurst started firing back; as a result,
after opening the car door, he retreated into the car, being
struck twice during this time, and attempted to drive away.

The

.25 automatic was found on the floor under the gas pedal (R.
1322); perhaps in the confusion and pain, he was unable to locate
it in order to shoot Trooper Bringhurst again.
Defendant was angry and upset on the night in question
(R. 783-89).

He had been drinking (R. 944), which would have

decreased his inhibitions.

He had weapons with him at the time

he spoke to Jean Hickam earlier in the evening, and made
threatening sounds with the guns by saying something to the
effect "load" and "unload" as he clicked the mechanisms (R. 786).
He was in this state of mind when Trooper Bringhurst saw him and
became concerned that he was possibly driving under the
influence.

It would be expected behavior of one who is driving

under the influence to do whatever reasonably possible to avoid
arrest; however, defendant sat through an entire light cycle at
the bottom of the 13th South off-ramp (R. 1407).

He also

responded affirmatively when asked at the next traffic light
whether he had been drinking (R. 950). He then picked a quiet,
secluded side street on which to pull over (R. 1417).

Trooper

Bringhurst approached defendant and asked if he had said he had
been drinking, and defendant replied, "It doesn't make any
difference, does it?", as he fired point blank with a sawed off
shotgun (R. 1426-28, 1435).

There can be no question with

respect to his intent to kill.
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In State v. Castonquayf 663 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1983), upon
which defendant relied to support his claim that he lacked the
intent to commit the crime, this Court held the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the verdict of attempted first degree
murder.

An assault during which a weapon is used is not

sufficient to presume that the assault was done with the intent
to produce death.

The particular intent must be proved by either

direct or circumstantial evidence.

This Court acknowledged that

criminal intent is seldom proved by direct evidence and must
instead be inferred from the circumstances involved.
Castonquay is easily distinguished on its facts.
Defendant was initially approached by two officers (one of whom
was the alleged victim of the later incident).

They spoke and

parted on friendly terms. A short time later, defendant began to
apparently indiscriminately fire his rifle.

Some of the bullets

may have come near the officers, but there was no evidence to
support this.

The officer approached the defendant, took cover

from a distance of over 200 feet, and ordered him to drop his
gun.

The defendant did not respond; he testified that he had not

heard the command.

The officer testified that defendant again

fired his rifle; however, he did not see the shot being fired
(although it would have produced a visible muzzle blast) and no
spent bullet was ever found.

The other officer involved, from an

area near the defendant, ordered defendant to drop the rifle; the
defendant immediately complied.
distinguished from Castonquay.

The present case is easily
Here, inter alia, defendant fired

point blank at the officer at a distance of about five feet.
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Prior to the shot, he grinned at the officer as he made a
sarcastic comment.

Part of the pellets from the shell struck

Trooper Bringhurst on the side of the head.

In fact, had Trooper

Bringhurst not taken evasive action, the blast would have, with
near certainty, resulted in his death.
In Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504
(1922), cited in Castonguay, the court held that the evidence of
attempted murder was insufficient.

The defendant attempting to

shoot a light out, fired three shots, two of which went through a
tent in which a family was camping; one bullet passed through the
head of the bed in which someone was sleeping.

The evidence was

found not to be sufficient to sustain a verdict of attempted
murder.
The evidence in this case was more than sufficient to
establish defendant's intent to commit murder.

Because the

evidence, and the inferences drawn from it, establish defendant's
intent, this Court should sustain defendant's conviction for
attempted first degree murder.

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 345

(Utah 1985).
B. Defendant's Level of Intoxication Did Not Negate
His Intent to Commit the Crime.
Defendant contends that his intoxicated condition
prevented him from forming the requisite intent necessary for the
commission of attempted criminal homicide.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

2-306 (1978) provides in pertinent part that •'[vjoluntary
intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which
is an element of the offense . . . . • •
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Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree
murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(k) (Supp. 1986).
Although criminal homicide covers various mental states, the
requisite mental state for the commission of the crime in this
case was that defendant committed the specified acts knowingly or
intentionally.
A person acts intentionally when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the
result; a person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.
S 76-2-103(1) and (2) (1978).

See Utah Code Ann.

In State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220,

1223 (Utah 1983), this Court stated with reference to proof of
intent that "intent need not be proved by direct evidence.

It

may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from
surrounding circumstances" (footnotes omitted).
Although defendant did not argue to the jury during
closing argument the defense of voluntary intoxication (R. 676702), evidence was adduced at trial with respect to his
consumption of alcohol and blood alcohol level at the time he was
hospitalized (R. 944-45).

The jury was instructed on this

defense in instruction No. 26 (R. 172).1

Despite his failure to

Instruction No. 26 states:
Under the law, a state of voluntary
intoxication from alcohol or drugs is not a
defense to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication is of such degree or state as to
negate the existence of the mntal state which
is an element of the offense.
Evidence of intoxication may thus be taken
into consideration by the jury in connection

actively pursue this potential defense at trial, defendant now
requests this Court to overturn his conviction because he
allegedly did not have the requisite mental intent.

The jury

chose not to acquit based upon his voluntary intoxication; the
jury found the requisite intent—that he acted knowingly and
intentionally when he shot the trooper—because they found, in
convicting the defendant as charged, all of the elements of
attempted first degree murder.
The most reliable evidence of defendant's intoxication
was the blood alcohol test result.

Defendant introduced

evidence, by way of stipulation, that his blood alcohol level at
2:00 a.m. was .20 percent (R. 945). Defendant testified that he
had consumed "a liter and a fifth" of whiskey prior to the time
2
he left a party at 1:00 a.m. (R. 947). Officer Evans testified
that he observed no evidence of intoxication; Officer Fowler

Cont.
Cont. with determiing the intent
with which any particular act may have been
committed.
Being under the influence of alcohol or drugs
is no excuse for the commission of a crime
where it merely makes a person more excited
or reckless, so that one does things one
might not otherwise have done. To be a
defense to such a crime, one must be so under
the influence of alcohol or drugs that at the
time of the alleged offense, he was then and
there incapable of acting intentionally or
knowingly.
If from the evidence you have a reasonable
doubt whether the defendant was capable of
acting intentionally or knowingly, then you
must find the defendant not guilty.
2
Defendant's testimony regarding his consumption was obviously
exaggerated and is contrary to the blood test result. A liter
and a fifth of alcohol would constitute 59.2 ounces.
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testified that he observed a strong odor of alcohol.

While there

was some conflict and discrepancy about whether defendant showed
signs of intoxication and to what degree, this was a question for
the jury to resolve.

In State v. McCullar# 674 P.2d 117, 118

(Utah 1983) this Court stated that " [jJudging the credibility of
the witnesses and weight of the evidence is exclusively the
prerogative of the jury."
Defendant's actions are the second best indicator of
his level of intoxication.

His driving pattern, while certainly

reckless, was not so egregious as to establish intoxication
sufficient to negate his intent.

When defendant stopped at the

first traffic light, by his own admission, he was sufficiently
aware of the surrounding circumstances to know that the trooper
was "interested" in him.

He was able to understand and reply to

Trooper Bringhurst's question regarding whether he had been
drinking.

Defendant was able to recall these details after the

event.
Defendant's actions after the shooting also show that
he was not sufficiently intoxicated so as to negate the intent
element of attempted murder.

Defendant immediately fled in his

car after the shooting (R. 1223).

After he lost control of the

car, probably due to excessive speed, the raised railroad tracks
and the turn in the road, he exited the passenger door, turned
around twice as if looking for a place to run, and fled on foot
down a dark alley (R. 1230-31 )•

Despite the fact that Officer

Evans was neither injured nor had consumed alcohol, he was not
able to apprehend him during the chase until defendant reached a
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chain link fence that he could not climb (R. 1229-30).

Defendant

attempted to get away by struggling with Officer Evans, and the
officer had to forcibly subdue him (R. 1233).

These actions are

not consistent with the behavior of someone who is so under the
influence that he would be unable to intentionally or knowingly
engage in conduct.
Defendant was sufficiently cognizant that he was able
to think up a defense to his crime immediately upon his
apprehension.

He told Officer Evans that he had caught the wrong

man, that he didn't shoot the trooper, and that someone else—a
person wanted by the police—had done the shooting (R. 1243,
1047).

He obviously knew he was in serious trouble and was

sufficiently mindful to immediately begin efforts to avoid the
consequences.

Again these actions are not consistent with his

being under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he could
not form the requisite intent for attempted murder.
In State v. Lenzinq, 688 P.2d 492 (Utah 1984),
defendant was convicted of attempted homicide, aggravated
robbery, and carrying a concealed weapon.
victim were residents of a hobo camp.

The defendant and the

They had both been

drinking on the evening of the incident.

After a short

conversation, the defendant stabbed the victim in the back, chest
and stomach.
backpack.

Defendant then stole the victim's watch and

An experience officer testified at trial that the

defendant had been drinking but was not intoxicated.
stated:
While the evidence on the degree of
intoxication was conflicting, there was
-33-

This Court

evidence which, if believed by the jury, was
sufficient to find that appellant was not
incapable of forming the requisite intent.
We certainly cannot hold as a matter of law
as the appellant would have us do, that the
evidence of his intoxication was so
persuasive as to negate the required intent
for attempted criminal homicide.
Id. at 493.
The present case is similar to the case of State v.
Bush, 646 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982), in which the defendant, while
under the influence of alcohol, kidnapped several people, stole
two cars, shot at one of the passengers in the car he was
driving, and engaged in a high speed chase with police before
crashing and being apprehended.

Two of those kidnapped testified

that during the ordeal the defendant spoke coherently and
followed directions without difficulty, despite referring to
himself as a drunk-crazed murderer.

The judge in Bush returned a

verdict of guilty of aggravated kidnapping, attempted homicide,
and aggravated robbery.
This Court noted that while Bush may have been
intoxicated, the evidence of his ability to communicate and make
decisions was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that he
was capable of forming the requisite intent for the crimes with
which he was charged.
was affirmed.

Therefore, the verdict of the fact finder

See also State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah

1981).
On the facts presented in the instant case, the jury,
as trier of fact, could reasonably conclude appellant's
intoxication did not negate his intent.

Although appellant had

been drinking and his blood alcohol content was .20 percent, he
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was coherent and could understand what was going on around him,
make decisions, and even formulate a defense to his crime.
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), the
defendant claimed that he was so intoxicated that he could not
form the requisite intent to commit murder.

This Court held that

the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on voluntary
intoxication.

Although there was evidence that the defendant had

been drinking, there was no evidence that he was so intoxicated
at the time of the crime that he was unable to form the intent
necessary to prove robbery.
This Court said in Wood, 648 P.2d at 90, that in order
for the defendant to successfully use the defense of
intoxication, it would have been necessary to show that his mind
had been affected to such an extent that he did not have the
capacity to form the requisite intent.

In the present case,

defendant has not shown that there was such a significant impact
on his capacity to reason that he could not knowingly or
intentionally commit the crime.

Defendant presented only his

self-serving statements and the blood alcohol analysis pursuant
to stipulation to establish his intoxication.

He presented no

expert testimony on this issue, and did not even argue the
defense during closing argument.

Whether defendant's

intoxication was so significant that he did not have the
requisite intent to commit the crime is a question for the jury
to determine.

State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981).

The

evidence with respect to defendant's intent commit the crime and
his intoxication was not so inherently improbable or inconclusive

to justify this Court disregarding the determination made by the
trier of fact.

Defendant's argument in this regard is without

merit.
As this Court stated in State v. Underwood, 737 P.2d
995 (Utah 1987 ) # when reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of
the evidence, the court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the jury.

"It is the exclusive function of the jury to

determine the credibility of the witnesses."

Ici. at 996 (citing

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)).

"When there is

any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from it, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can be reasonably made, our inquiry stops and we sustain
the verdict."

Id.
POINT II

DEFENDANT'S PRIOR THEFT CONVICTIONS WERE
PROPERLY ADMITTED FOR PURPOSES OF IMPEACHMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 609, UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
Defendant filed a motion in limine in which he
requested a ruling from the trial court regarding admission of
evidence of his prior convictions for purposes of impeachment.
The court granted the motion with respect to defendant's
convictions for burglary, two convictions for escape, assault
with a deadly weapon, robbery, child abuse, and battery; it
denied the motion with respect to defendant's prior convictions
for theft and theft by deception, ruling that they were
admissible under Rule 609 (R. 1525, 1529).
Rule 609(a), Utah R. Evid., provides as follows:

For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
(Emphasis added•)
The trial court ruled that theft is a crime of
dishonesty.

In making its determination, it relied on State v.

Cintron, 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1984) in which this Court found
that a misdemeanor theft conviction involves "dishonesty or false
statement."

This Court also stated in Terry v. Zions Co-op

Mercantile, 605 P.2d 314, 324 n. 36 (Utah 1979) (citations
omitted), this Court stated that "[a]ny crime involving the theft
of another person's property is generally considered as involving
dishonesty."

Although Cintron was decided under former Rule 21,

Utah R. Evid. (1971), the language contained in the former rule
and present Rule 609 is identical.

Former Rule 21, Utah R. Evid.

(1971) provided that crimes "involving dishonesty or false
statement" were admissible.

Consequently, the trial court

properly relied on this Court's interpretation of dishonesty,
which includes misdemeanor theft, in making its determination.
The rule says that a conviction involving dishonesty or false
statement "shall be admitted."

Utah R. Evid. 609(a).

Consequently, the balancing test set forth in State v. Banner 717
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) is inapplicable.

-37-

Defendant relies on Banner for his claim that the
Cintron case is not applicable and that the trial court
erroneously relied on it to justify his conclusion that theft is
a crime of dishonesty.

In Banner, 717 P.2d at 1333-34, this

Court stated that the rules of evidence adopted in 1983 provide a
-fresh starting place" for the law of evidence in Utah and in an
effort to achieve uniformity with the federal rules it would look
to federal decisions to aid in interpreting the Utah rules.

See

also State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986).
The federal decisions addressing Rule 609, Fed. R.
Evid., however, are in conflict.

There is a split of authority

as to whether theft constitutes a crime of dishonesty.

See

United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362-363 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).

Although,

it appears that the majority of federal courts have ruled that
theft is not a crime of dishonesty, Smith at 845-848, that
position is not binding on this Court.

The better reasoned

position, is that theft constitutes a crime of dishonesty or
false statement.
In United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 845-6 (7th
Cir. 1977), the court stated:
Beginning with the language of the Rule
itself, we note that "dishonesty" is by
definition, a "disposition to lie, cheat, or
steal." Random House College Dictionary 380
(abr. ed. 1973) (emphasis added). Moreover,
H
[i)n common human experience, acts of
deceit, fraud, cheating or stealing . . . are
universally regarded as conduct which
reflects adversely on a man's honesty and
integrity." Gordon v. United States, 127
U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940, cert,
denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20
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L.Ed.2d 287 (1967 (emphasis added). A common
sense approach to the language of Rule
609(a)(2) would support the conclusion that
[the defendant's] prior conviction was
admissible because theft is a crime involving
"dishonesty" within the common meaning of
that term.
Because of the division in the federal courts on this issue, the
federal decisions provide little guidance on how the rule should
be interpreted.

If the objective in following federal case law

is to provide uniformity between the Utah rules and the federal
rules, the purpose will not be advanced by ruling contrary to
Cintron that theft is not a crime of dishonesty or false
statement because there is no uniformity in the federal courts.
A number of state courts that have decided this issue
have rejected the federal decisions that find that theft is not a
crime of dishonesty or false statement.

See e.g. People v.

Morstatter, 362 N.E.2d 809, 810 (111. App. 1977); State v.
Miller, 229 N.W.2d 762, 769 (Iowa 1975); State v. Page, 449 So.
2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1987); State v. Johnson, 460 N.E.2d 625, 629
(Ohio App. 1983).
The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed this
issue in State v. Brown, 43 Crim. Law. Rep. (BNA) 2315 (Wash.
July 14, 1988) and held that theft, shoplifting, and robbery are
crimes involving "dishonesty" and are therefore admissible for
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2).

The court overruled

its previous decision in which it had held that theft is a crime
of dishonesty only when it involves an element of fraud or
deceit, finding that its previous reliance on federal case law
was misguided.

The court stated:
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First, federal case law interpreting federal
rules is not binding upon this court.
Second, we have grave reservations about the
soundness of the federal courts' restrictive
construction of Rule 609(a)(2) to exclude per
se admissibility of prior theft convictions.
The courts appear to give little independent
meaning to the word MdishonestyM even though
the disjunctive "or" is used to link the word
to "false statement" Several states with
rules similar to ours have concluded that
theft crimes involve dishonesty or false
statement despite the federal courts'
insistence to the contrary.
The term "dishonest" implies the act or
practice of telling a lie, or of cheating,
deceiving and stealing. Webster's Third New
Int'l Dictionary 659 (1981). Crimes of theft
involve stealing and thus are clearly
encompassed within the term dishonest. There
is no reason to believe that a person's
propensity to lie may be demonstrated by past
acts of lying but not by past acts of
dishonest conduct. The purpose of
impeachment—enlightening the jury with
respect to the defendant's credibility as a
witness—is met by allowing admissibility of
prior convictions evidencing dishonesty,
regardless of the fact that the conduct had
as its purpose the taking of another's
property.
Id. at 2316-17.
Because this Court has previously interpreted the
language "dishonesty or false statement" to encompass the crime
of misdemeanor theft, because the federal law is in conflict and
not controlling, and because common sense dictates that theft is,
indeed, a crime of dishonesty, this Court should find that a
defendant can be impeached by evidence of prior theft convictions
pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence.
In the present case, the trial court ruled, in limine,
that evidence of defendant's prior convictions for theft by
deception and theft was admissible.
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Defendant testified to these

convictions on direct examination (R. 946). It is implicit in
the conviction for theft by deception that some element of deceit
was involved; the title of the offense leaves little room for
doubt.

Regardless, the crime did, in fact, involve fraudulent

and deceitful means (R. 1526-27).

Thus, even if this Court were

to adopt the majority position in the federal courts which
interprets the phrase "dishonesty or false statement" to require
an element of fraud or deceit, defendant's conviction for theft
by deception was properly admitted.

Because the theft by

deception was properly admitted, even if the "straight" theft
were improperly admitted, its admission would at most be harmless
error.

Any prejudice to defendant would have been minimal.
The standard of review for error in cases involving an

abuse of discretion by the trial court in not excluding evidence
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, is whether "there
was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant."

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1987)

citing, State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); Banner,
717 P.2d at 1335 (citing State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1984).

Even if this Court were to find an abuse of discretion on

the part of the trial court in ruling the defendant's theft
convictions admissible for impeachment purposes, the error would
have been of a non-constitutional nature and did not affect his
substantial rights.

In accordance with Utah R. Crim. P. 30, any

error not affecting the "substantial rights" of the defendant
shall be disregarded.

Because the evidence at trial clearly

established defendant's guilt, even if he had been improperly
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impeached/ there is no likelihood there would have been a more
favorable result without the contested evidence.
POINT III
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF TROOPER BRINGHURST'S
UNIFORM WAS GREATER THAN ITS PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT AND WAS, THEREFORE, ADMISSIBLE UNDER
RULE 403.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that
evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice."

It

is the contention of the defendant, in the present matter, that
the probative value of Trooper Bringhurst's uniform is less than
the prejudicial effect and therefore, the trial court erred in
its admission.

Within the context of Rule 403, "unfair

prejudice" requires that the disputed evidence have more than
mere detrimental effect on the defendant's case; it must have an
"undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one."

United

States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted).
Defendant's allegation is based on his belief that the
admission of Trooper Bringhurst's blood-stained uniform inflamed
and prejudiced the jury causing them to convict because of their
sympathy and support for the injured trooper, rather than because
of their belief that he actually committed the crime charged (Br.
of App. at 36). As authority for his allegation, defendant
relies on cases in which gruesome photographs or slides of the
victim's body before, during, and after an autopsy had been
performed were admitted into evidence by the trial courts and
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later deemed inflammatory by the reviewing courts because the
evidence failed to address a disputed issue.

See e.g., State v.

Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439 (Utah 1988); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986),
citing, State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979)); State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988); State v. Beers, 448 P.2d 104
(Ariz. App. 1968); State v. Oxendine, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1958); and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah
1968).
In its determination that the gruesome photographs of
the charred body and skull of the victim did not have probative
value as to whether the defendant was in fact the perpetrator,
the Chappie court set forth criteria which the trial court should
consider when determining the probative value of gruesome
exhibits:
In making this determination, the trial court
must examine the purpose of the offer. . . .
[We have] identified the following uses for
which allegedly [gruesome evidence] may be
admitted in a homicide prosecution: to prove
the corpus delicti, to identify the victim,
to show the nature and location of the fatal
injury, to help determine the degree of
atrociousness of the crime, to corroborate
state witnesses, to illustrate or explain
testimony, and to corroborate the state's
theory of how and why the homicide was
committed. If any of these questions is
contested, either expressly or implicitly,
then the trial court may find the [evidence
has] more than mere technical relevance; it
may find that the [evidence has] a 'bearing'
to prove a contested issue in the case and
may, therefore, be admissible notwithstanding
a tendency to create prejudice.
Chappie, 660 P.2d at 1215 (citations omitted).

Accord, State v.

Royball, 710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985) (evidence may be relevant
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if it assists the trier of fact in understanding the nature of
the crime charged or how the crime occurred); State v. Garcia,
663 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1983) (the more essential the evidentiary value
of the evidence the greater the defendant's burden to require its
exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory nature would be
prejudicial to him).
In State v. Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978), cited
by defendant as an example of a reviewing court determining it
was error on the part of the trial court to admit the victim's
bloody shirt, the court based its decision on the fact that the
entrance and exit wounds had been clearly demonstrated by
photographs of the body of the victim, with the result that
introduction of the victim's bloody shirt added nothing to the
evidence to be considered by the jury but rather tended to arouse
and inflame their emotions.

Relying upon the criteria set forth

in Chappie, the Steele opinion is distinguishable from the
present case.

The admission of Trooper Bringhurst's uniform was

necessary in order for the State to:

(1) establish that Johnson

knowingly fired at a uniformed officer of the law, and (2)
corroborate the testimony of Trooper Bringhurst.

Therefore,

defendant's allegations are without merit because the probative
value of the uniform was greater than its prejudicial effect and
the evidence was properly admitted by the trial court.
It is within the sound discretion of the
trial court to determine whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs the
possible adverse effect it might have on the
jury, and the discretion on the part of a
trial judge to admit or reject evidence
should not be interfered with by this Court
unless manifest error is shown.
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State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352-53 (Utah 1977) (citing State
v. Poef 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968)).

Accord,

State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483 (Utah 1981); State v. Danker, 599
P.2d 518 (Utah 1979); State v. Renzo, 443 P.2d 392 (Utah 1968).
The prosecution, as in every case, had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense.
The prosecution did not know until the defense presented its case
what the defense would be; therefore, the State was entitled to
present all relevant evidence to support its case.

Apparently,

from defendant's statements to Officer Evans, he was going to
assert that someone other than he shot the trooper; therefore,
considerable effort went into ruling out this possibility.

Other

possible defenses were that the gun accidentally discharged or
that defendant did not know Bringhurst was a law enforcement
officer.

One of the elements of the crime required proof that

defendant knowingly and intentionally attempted to kill a law
enforcement officer; therefore, the uniform was relevant to
establish that there could be no mistake as to Trooper
Bringhurst's association with law enforcement.

Earlier that day

defendant had, in a threatening manner, referenced police
officers when telling Jean Hickam that he had guns and that no
one should try to stop him.

Additionally, the defense appeared

to focus on discrediting the Trooper's credibility and ability to
perceive and recall; therefore, the uniform was relevant to
corroborate his testimony.
This Court should affirm the decision of the trial
court, to admit the blood-stained uniform, State's exhibits 41
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and 42, because it was relevant to establish that defendant
intended to shoot a police officer, a disputed issue in the case.
Furthermore, as compared to the gruesome photographs of victim's
bodies, a shirt with dried blood stains on the shoulder is not
likely to incite passion or inflame the emotions of a jury.
probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The

Therefore,

the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion in
admitting Trooper Bringhurst's uniform.
POINT IV
THE TESTIMONY OF JEAN HICKAM WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED.
The trial court properly denied defense counsel's
motions to exclude the testimony of Jean Hickam because her
testimony was relevant and the probative value outweighed any
prejudicial effect.
A.

Hickam's testimony was relevant.

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that
evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Relying upon

standards set forth in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986),
defendant alleges that the testimony of Jean Hickam was
irrelevant and, therefore, improperly admitted at trial.

"Rule

401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that for evidence to
be relevant, it must have a tendency to make the existence of any
fact of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
Id. at 1316.

Defendant further alleges that Hickam's testimony

was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983) which provides:
46-

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant's interpretation of the aforementioned
authorities is erroneous in view of the facts of the present
case.

Hickam's testimony was relevant to defendant's intent.

was angry and upset that evening.

He

During the telephone

conversation with Hickam, she heard defendant click the
mechanisms of his gun as he made comments to the effect of "load"
and "unload" (R. 786). This is inconsistent with defendant's
testimony that he got the guns from a friend earlier that night
at a party and had tried not to touch them too much to avoid
causing fingerprints (R. 984). It also serves to rebut his
testimony that he does not own guns and had no idea how the guns
he had acquired at the party worked (R. 985-86).

Defendant had

made reference during the conversation to police officers when
stating that he was going to harm Michael Poulton and no one
should get in his way (R. 805, 809). He told Hickam he had a
rifle with a scope and would use it if the police were called (R.
805).

Evidence of Johnson's intent to shoot a police officer is

not only relevant, but "material to the crime charged," i.e.,
attempted murder.

State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1987).

Hickam's testimony comes within the exception stated in Rule
404(b) and was therefore properly admitted for the purpose of
establishing Johnson's intent to shoot Trooper Bringhurst.
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Defendant's remaining cited authorities are also easily
distinguished.

He contends that evidence of past conduct, where

no conviction is had, is not admissible "if the purpose is to
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a
propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed the
crime charged."

State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978).

However, this Court went on to state in Daniels that, "if the
evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding
the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose; and the
fact that it may tend to connect the defendant with another crime
will not render it incompetent."

Id.

at 882 (citations omitted).

See State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978) (testimony must be
relevant to the question of guilt or innocence of the defendant);
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985).
As discussed above, the testimony of Jean Hickam was
relevant to the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst because it
directly addresses the issue of defendant's intent.

Similar to

the situation in Daniels, Hickam's testimony is integral to an
explanation of the incident and, therefore, was properly admitted
to refute defendant's contention that his threats made earlier in
the evening of May 26 had nothing to do with the shooting of
Trooper Bringhurst.

Defendant alleges that the focus of the

threats testified to by Hickam was Michael Poulton and his
girlfriend, not a highway patrol officer who happened to
interfere hours later.

However, defendant's conduct was closely

related in time and was part of a series of events that evening.
See Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-401 (1978).

-48-

Hickam's testimony does

not describe a prior unrelated bad act on the part of defendant
but rather, a stirring of events which began with defendant's
threatening statements to Ms. Hickam and ended later that same
night in the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst.
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1344 (Utah 1977),
the defendant was charged with three counts of murder in the
first degree and two counts of aggravated robbery committed
during the robbery of the Ogden Hi-Fi Shop on April 22, 1974.
Evidence was admitted that the defendant "had stated in February,
1974, that he would like to rob a Hi-Fi Shop and would kill
anyone who got in his way."

JEd.

In the present matter, this

Court should affirm the admission of Hickam's testimony regarding
threats made by defendant on May 26, which revealed his intent to
shoot anyone, including police officers, who happened to
interfere with his plans to go after Poulton.

Jean Hickam's

testimony was relevant to the critical issue of defendant's
intent.

Thus, her testimony was properly admitted.
B.

The Probative Value of Jean Hickam's Testimony
Far Outweighs Any Prejudicial Effect on Johnson's
Character.

Rules 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that
evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

Defendant

contends that Hickam's testimony conjured up evidence of prior
bad acts on his part which prejudiced the jury to convict because
of bad character rather than because of actual guilt of the crime
charged.

For the reasons set forth above, this assertion is

without merit.

Relying upon United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004
(3rd Cir. 1976), Defendant implies that the prosecution had no
actual need to introduce Hickam's testimony and therefore created
a significant risk of undue prejudice against him.

However, the

Cook opinion is easily distinguishable from the present case.
The Cook court applied a balancing test to determine the
admissibility of the defendant's previous felony convictions and
stated that "[t]he trial court must consider the government's
actual need for that evidence.

The necessity for the testimony

in question must be measured against the high potential that
proof of a prior offense has for arousing the jury against the
accused."

Rl. at 1004 (footnote omitted).

Unlike the situation

in Cook, Hickam's testimony was necessary to prove an essential
element of the crime charged—defendant's intent.

In Cook, the

government had a variety of defendant's prior felony convictions
from which to choose one for presentation to the jury.

The

government then proceeded to choose the defendant's sodomy
conviction with apparent disregard for its high potential toward
inflaming the jury.

In the present case, the prosecution did not

attempt to introduce a prior felony conviction, but rather
evidence of Johnson's statements which revealed his intent to
shoot any police officer who interfered with his plans to go
after Poulton.

Defendant also relies on Gov't, of the Virgin

Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir. 1976) for the
proposition that Hickam's testimony should have been excluded on
the ground that the interest in protecting a defendant's
presumption of innocence precludes introduction of evidence of

prior bad acts committed by the defendant.

The Toto court

accordingly disallowed testimony of the defendant's prior
misdemeanor conviction.

The present case is distinguishable

because Hickam's testimony does not reveal a prior conviction on
the part of Johnson, rather, Hickam's testimony goes to conduct
on the part of Johnson which was part of one criminal episode,
the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst.
Johnson further contends that the testimony of Jean
Hickam was prejudicial in that it served to confuse the jury.
This contention is unsupportable in light of the fact that
Hickam's testimony clarified the nature of Johnson's conduct and
intent on the night of the shooting.
Because the testimony of Jean Hickam cannot be
described as revealing prejudicial prior crimes committed by
defendant, the fears expressed by defense counsel (Br. of App. at
42) that defendant was convicted on less evidence than would
ordinarily be required and that defendant Johnson was required to
defend an entire lifetime of incidents in a single trial are
without merit.

Therefore, Johnson was not submitted to unfair

prejudice by Hickam's testimony because the probative value far
outweighed any prejudicial effect the testimony may have had.
C.

The Trial Court's Decision To Admit The Testimony
of Jean Hickam Was Not An Abuse of Its Discretion.

Relying upon State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20
(Utah 1987), Johnson alleges that the trial court's decision to
admit the testimony of Jean Hickam is grounds for reversal
because the outcome would likely have been different had the
testimony not been admitted.

The Knight opinion is
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distinguishable from the present matter.

In Knight, the

prosecutor failed to comply with a discovery request made by
defense counsel for the address and telephone numbers of two key
witnesses.

This Court held it was reversible error to have

allowed the witnesses to testify because there was a reasonable
likelihood thatf absent the error, the outcome of the trial would
have been more favorable for the defendant, i.e., defendant's
counsel would have had the opportunity to prepare a response.

In

the present matter, Hickam's testimony did not come as a surprise
to defendant, who had a fair opportunity to prepare a defense.
Whether to admit Hickam's testimony was within the discretion of
the trial court.
It is within the sound discretion of the
trial court to determine whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs the
possible adverse effect it might have on the
jury, and the discretion on the part of a
trial judge to admit or reject evidence
should not be interfered with by this Court
unless manifest error is shown.
Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1352-53 (citing State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d
205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968)).

See also, State v. Gallo, 582 P.2d

558, 565 (Wash. App. 1978).
The trial court did not commit manifest error or an
abuse of its discretion in the decision to admit the testimony of
Jean Hickam concerning the evidence relevant to defendant's state
of mind and intent.

Hickam's testimony was integral to an

explanation of the series of events on May 26 which ended with
the shooting of Trooper Bringhurst.

Hickam's testimony also

pointed to inconsistencies in defendant's testimony, specifically
his acquisition of and knowledge regarding the guns. Thus,
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Johnson's first contention that Ms. Hickam's testimony was
irrelevant and therefore improperly admitted is without merit.
The trial court's decision that Hickam's testimony has
relevant was not an abuse of discretion.

The testimony was

relevant to defendant's intent, which was the central issue in
the case.

Further Hickam's testimony was probative and the

probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

Ms. Hickam's

testimony was necessary to Johnson's intent to shoot any one,
including police officers, who got in his way, a material element
of the crime with which Johnson was charged.

Therefore, any

prejudicial effect Ms. Hickam's testimony may have had was far
outweighed by its probative value.

Because the trial court

clearly acted within the scope of its discretion in deciding to
allow the testimony of Ms. Hickam, no manifest error was
committed and therefore, no grounds for reversal are present.
State v. McCardle, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982); State v. Pierre, 572
P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978).
POINT V
OFFICER VERN OLSEN'S TESTIMONY THAT HE WAS
GUARDING DEFENDANT AT THE HOSPITAL JUST DAYS
AFTER THE CRIME WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Defendant claims that the testimony of Officer Vern
Olsen constituted reversible error when the following testimony
was elicited during direct exam:
Q. (By the Prosecutor) Officer Olsen, would
you state your full name for the record,
please.
A.

Yes.

Vern Lee Olsen.

Q.

What is your occupation?
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A.

Police officer.

Q.

How long have you been a police officer?

A.

Eight and a half years.

Q.

Who do you work for?

A.

Salt Lake City Corporation.

Q. Are you familiar with the defendant,
Danny Lee Johnson?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

And how did you come to know him?

A. I spent guard duty one day up at the
hospital on him.
Q.

Which hospital.

A.

UMC, I believe.

Q.

Could it have been LDS Hospital?

A.

I am sorry, yes, it was.

Q. Do you recall particularly which hospital
it was now that you think about it?
A. Not offhand. I have had several guard
duties in the last little while.
Q.

And what is hospital guard duty?

A. Basically you're there to stop any escape
attempts.
(R. 1075).
The prosecutor then directed the attention of the
witness to May 31, 1986, and elicited testimony regarding
statements made by the defendant concerning the shooting incident
(R. 1075-79).
Defendant claims that this testimony, specifically the
question regarding what constitutes guard duty, was so
prejudicial that he is entitled to a new trial.
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Defendant claims

that Officer Olsen's explanation of guard duty—that is being
present to prevent escape attempts—somehow paints defendant as
an "escape risk," and that therefore he was labeled as violent
and dangerous (Br. App. at 45.).

Defendant's contention is

without merit and is not supported by the evidence.
The question asked of Officer Olsen was general in
nature concerning his duties.

The officer's answer was that he

was there to prevent any escape attempts—not that defendant is a
violent, dangerous person and was an escape risk.

The officer

had been on guard duty so many times that he could not
specifically remember whether he was at University Medical Center
or LDS Hospital; the jury was left with the impression that guard
duty is a routine event, and did not take place because defendant
is an "escape risk" as he alleges.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738
(Utah 1985) is misplaced.

In Saunders, this Court stated that

evidence of prior crimes is not admissible to show criminal
disposition of the defendant, and that such evidence is presumed
prejudicial absent a reason for its admission other than to show
criminal disposition.

This Court held that evidence that

Saunders was a restricted person, for purposes of establishing
the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, was improperly joined with the crime of burglary; the
evidence clearly implied that defendant had been convicted of a
prior crime.

First, in the present case, no evidence of prior

crimes was presented during Officer Olsen's testimony.

Even if

defendant had been characterized as an escape risk, it would not
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constitute evidence of prior crimes.

Second, the prosecutor's

question and the officer's answer were to provide background and
foundation for the subsequent testimony, and were not directed
specifically at defendant but rather to the officer's general
duties.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110
(Utah 1986) is also misplaced.

In Slowe, this Court held that

evidence of defendant's prior perjury conviction was admissible
despite it having occurred over ten years previously because its
probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

In its

determination, this Court found that what is probative is likely
to be prejudicial and defined "prejudicial" as being
"inflammatory in the sense that the jury may use the conviction
against the defendant for purposes other than determining
defendant's credibility, and therefore would tend to induce the
jury to render a verdict outside the relevant substantive
evidence being on the material elements of the crime."
112-13.

^d. at

First, in this case, there was no evidence of a prior

conviction or prior crimes.

Second, as set forth above, the

introduction of this evidence was not inflammatory and did not
have a prejudicial effect on the jury.

The present case is

unlike cases in which the jury is allowed to see a defendant in
"handcuffs, shackles, or jail clothes;" in those cases, the
inevitable association between the prejudicial material and the
defendant would be readily apparent.
Officer Olsen's testimony related to events less than
four days after defendant attempted to kill a police officer.
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The jury was aware that defendant had been taken to LDS Hospital
for treatment of his wounds.

The jury obviously knew that

defendant was eventually charged with the crime.

That the jury

knew that defendant was "guarded" only four days after the crime
is not inflammatory.

Even if the evidence had some level of

prejudicial effect, the prejudice would be minimal and certainly
does not justify a reversal in this case.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DECLINING TO
DECLARE LT. FALLOWS A HOSTILE WITNESS.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in refusing
to declare Lt. Fallows a hostile witness in order to allow the
defense, who had called him as a witness, to proceed with leading
questions pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 611(c).

Defendant claims

that the rule does not require that actual hostility be
demonstrated, and that the trial court misunderstood the rule and
consequently abused his discretion making in the ruling.
However, defendant makes no claim that he is entitled to relief
on this ground.

As set forth below, even if the trial court was

in error in refusing to declare Lt. Fallows a hostile witness for
purposes of allowing direct examination by leading questions,
there was no prejudice and, therefore, defendant is not entitled
to relief.

Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467

(11th Cir. 1984).
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Utah R. Evid. 611(c) states:
Leading questions should not be used on the
direct examination of a witness except as may
be necessary to develop his testimony.
Ordinarily leading questions should be
permitted on cross-examination. When a party
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or
a witness identified with an adverse party,
interrogation may be by leading questions.
(Empha sis added.)
The word "may" signifies that leading questions are not
mandatory, but may be used when appropriate.

The word "may" also

implies that the determination is within the sound discretion of
the trial court.

See Ellis v. City of Chicago, 667 F.2d 606, 613

(7th Cir. 1981).

In the present case, the trial court ruled

initially that Lt. Fallows was not a hostile witness within the
ambit of Rule 611(c).

Prior to making the ruling, both the

defense and the prosecution elicited testimony from Lt. Fallows
outside the presence of the jury to aid the trial court in making
its determination.
Lt. Fallows was asked by defense counsel, "Is it true
that you did not want any appearance of associating with the
defense?"

(R. 869.)

Lt. Fallows responded, "I wouldn't say that

that is a correct statement.

I honor the subpoena."

(R. 869.)

When asked about his feelings concerning the case, he said, "It's
a situation where obviously I have feelings but I also have a
duty which I will perform."

(R. 870.)

Lt. Fallows swore to tell

the truth regardless of the consequences (R. 872), and he
promised to answer all questions fairly and honestly regardless
of his feelings concerning the case (R. 872). In fact, Lt.
Fallows said, -That's where the reluctance comes in, because I
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will answer truthfully and honestly regardless of the eventual
outcome, and that is, I guess, what causes the reluctance within
myself that I have no choice but to tell the truth (R. 873),
Whether to allow leading questions during direct
examination is a matter left to the discretion of the trial
court.

United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1979);

Bruce Hughes, Inc. v. Inqels & Associates, 653 P.2d 88 (Colo.
App. 1982).

However, even courts that find mere identification

with the adverse party to be sufficient, require a showing of
actual prejudice before the defendant is entitled to relief on
appeal.

Ellis v. City of Chicago, 667 F.2d at 613.

Even if this

Court were to find Lt. Fallows should have declared hostile,
because defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling, the decision
of the trial court was, at most, harmless error.
The trial court did not allow defense counsel to
proceed at the outset of her examination of Lt. Fallows by
leading questions; however, after obtaining background
information and foundation for the substance of the testimony,
defense counsel began using leading questions (R. 884). The
trial court overruled the prosecutor's objection to the leading
questions (R. 886-87), stating that it may be necessary for
defense counsel to lead.

As a result, during most of the

remaining direct examination—which was the significant portion
of the testimony—defense counsel used leading questions (R. 88794, Appendix A ) .
The record reflects, despite occasional confusion
regarding the questions, total cooperation on the part of Lt.

Fallows.

Defendant did not claim at trial at the conclusion of

Lt. Fallow's testimony that he was unable to elicit any desired
information from him.

On appeal, defendant has failed to

identify what information he was unable to obtain.

Consequently,

any claim of prejudice would be totally speculative.

Ellis, 667

F.2d at 613; Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467,
1969 (11th Cir. 1984).
Rule 611(c) provides that leading questions "may" be
asked on direct examination when the witness is identified with
the adverse party.
discretion.

Thus the matter is within the trial court's

Based on Lt. Fallows cooperation during direct

examination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to declare him a hostile witness.

Defendant must show

actual prejudice as the result of the error.

He has not made

such a claim, and the record would not support such an
allegation.
disregarded.

The error, if any, was harmless and should be
Utah R. Crim. P. 30.

Consequently, defendant is

not entitled to a reversal of his conviction.
POINT VII
BECAUSE TROOPER BRINGHURST WAS IMPEACHED
DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION, HIS REPUTATION FOR
TRUTHFULNESS WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
The focus of the defense was to elicit prior
inconsistent statements, however minor, made by Trooper
Bringhurst.

The theory, as argued by defense counsel in closing,

was that if Trooper Bringhurst was not certain of what occurred,
the jury could not convict (R. 682). During cross examination,
defense counsel brought out several inconsistencies between the
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statements made to Detective Johnson the day after the incident,
to Lt. Fallows two days after the incident, to Reporter Tom Walsh
ten days after the incident, and made at the preliminary hearing
which took place on June 25, 1986, about a month after the
incident.
One of the inconsistencies was Trooper Bringhurst's
testimony at trial that after he had asked defendant whether he
said he had been drinking, defendant raised the shotgun and said,
H

It doesn't make any difference, does it?M (R. 1426)

During

cross examination, defense counsel asked the trooper about a
statement made to Lt. Fallows two days after the incident, which
was that when discussing defendant's statement he said, "Hell, I
wish I could remember what he said."

(R. 535).

Trooper Bringhurst was also questioned about several
other statements that, particularly when taken out of context,
were inconsistent with his trial testimony.

For example, the

trooper testified at trial that he stopped about five to six feet
from defendant's car (R. 1425).

At one point during the hospital

interview, he had told Lt. Fallows that he was 18 inches away
from the car (R. 893). He was also questioned about inconsistent
statements he had made concerning the position of his flashlight
(R. 80, 87-108-136, 37-512-514); how fast defendant's car was
traveling on 3rd West (R. 121, 122, 507-08); what he had said to
defendant as he approached the car (Det. Johnson testified that
Trooper Bringhurst had told him that he had asked defendant for
his drivers license—not whether he had been drinking) (R. 1062);
whether he believed when he was shot that he was going to live or
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die (R. 90, 148, 546-47); and whether he had eye contact with
defendant at the light at the 13th South off-ramp (R. 887).
There were numerous other attempts to bring out additional
inconsistent statements.
Defendant's contention that he elicited prior
inconsistent statements for the purpose of establishing Trooper
Bringhurst's inability to recall the event, not to raise doubts
as to his credibility, is a distinction without a difference.

If

Trooper Bringhurst truly could not recall what occurred, he would
consequently be a witness who was not credible.

Some statements,

while taken out of context, were definitely inconsistent.

His

character for truthfulness had been attacked and, therefore, his
credibility had been attacked within the meaning of the rule.
The focus of the cross-examination was to elicit prior
inconsistent statements, which had the effect of impuning the
trooper's credibility.

The obvious implication was that his

character for truthfulness was questionable.

For example, if the

trooper could not remember what defendant said as he approached
the car at the point when he was questioned by Lt. Fallows, he
would not likely remember it later and the inference would be
that he must have made it up.
Utah Rule Evid. 608(a) states:
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct
of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of
character. The credibility of a witness may
be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may
refer only to character for the truthfulness
or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of
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truthful character is admissible only after
the character of the witness for truthfulness
has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
In Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 503 (7th Cir.
1979), a case in which the plaintiff had been convicted of murder
and then sued an FBI agent who had investigated the case, the
U.S. attorney who had prosecuted the case testified at trial
regarding the agent's reputation for truthfulness.

Evidence of

the agent's inconsistent statements had been admitted, which
resulted in an attack on the agent's credibility.

The court

found that the use of prior inconsistent statements may
constitute an attack on credibility and, therefore, the U.S.
attorney's testimony that the agent had a reputation for
truthfulness was properly admitted.

The court cited United

States v. Hall, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) in which the Supreme Court
stated "that '[a] basic rule of evidence provides that prior
inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of
a witness.'"

Jki. at 503. The court concluded that the trial

court's ruling to allow the testimony pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
608(a) was not an abuse of discretion.
Trooper Bringhurst's credibility had been impeached by
the defense focus on inconsistent statements. Therefore,
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 608(a), evidence of Trooper
Bringhurst's truthfulness was properly admitted.
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POINT VIII
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AFFORDED BY
THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS WERE
NOT VIOLATED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT WAS
ASKED QUESTIONS BY TWO JURORS DURING THE
TRIAL.
Defendant contends that he was denied his right to a
fair trial and that the denial rises to the level of a violation
of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution.

He also contends that his right to a fair and

impartial jury guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution was violated.

Defendant asserts that the conduct of

two jurors during the course of the trial amounted to reversible
error.
During the course of the trial, the following dialogue
occurred.
Q. (By Defense Counsel) Do you recall
testifying at the preliminary hearing that
you saw what you believed to be a shotgun?
A. (Trooper Bringhurst)
making that statement.
THE COURT:

I don't recall

Just one minute.

JUROR #6: I have a question. We were told
what was said in here today is what we're
supposed to go by totally; is that right?
THE COURT:

Just the evidence.

JUROR #6: Anything presented today.
THE COURT: Any time during the course of a
trial the only thing you're to consider is
the testimony from the witness who is talking
or any of the evidence that is introduced
into court.
JUROR #6: Okay. I'm just wondering.
myself, I cannot remember things that
happened —
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I know

THE COURT: Okay. Now, what you're going to
have to do is take the notes as much as
possible and then you're going to have to try
to recollect at the time you deliberate as to
what was taking place, then collectively,
you're going to all have an opportunity to
discuss the testimony of each of the
witnesses. And during that discussion, the
notes that you have taken and what you
remember is what you're going to be
considering and nothing else extraneous.
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, I think also if
the Court would indicate that the
significance will be tied up by the attorneys
and that they just need to listen to the
evidence.
THE COURT: Yes. They will be giving a
closing argument where they will try to piece
together everything like they did in the
opening argument.
JUROR #6:

That is what my guestion was.

THE COURT: From that you will have to put it
all together, because they will tell you what
each of these things meant and then what each
testified to.
JUROR #6:

That's what I was looking for.

JUROR #9: Maybe somebody doesn't know. I
don't know what a sawed off shotgun is. Is
it the barrel or the handle or both, or what?
You keep talking about a sawed off shotgun.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. PALACIOS:
THE COURT:

May we approach the bench?

Right.

[Discussion at bench.]
THE COURT: Normally during the trial we
don't have jurors ask questions. So if you
have any questions, if you will write it out
on a note pad, I will discuss it with the two
counsel so it will not influence the other
jurors in regards to any questions that you
may have at this time.

_«_

JUROR #9:

Thank you.

THE COURT: But at the end, the attorneys,
like I said, will be making a closing
statement . . . .
(R. 1496-98, emphasis added.)
Defendant contends that this exchange constituted
M

early deliberation" by the jury which denied him a fair and

impartial trial in violation of the due process clause.
First, defendant did not timely object and therefore
has not preserved this issue for appeal.

State v. Tillman, 750

P.2d 546 (Utah 1987); State v. Schreuderf 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah
1986).

Not only did defense counsel fail to timely object,

counsel participated in the conversation, thereby encouraging
further dialogue.
complain.

Therefore, defendant cannot now be heard to

After the conclusion of the interchange, while in

chambers for other defense motions, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial on the grounds that the jury was deliberating (R. 1501).
However, the motion was not timely; a contemporaneous objection
is required in order to preserve the issue, unless a valid reason
to do otherwise exists.

Schreuder at 1222.

Defendant did not

ask that the jurors be questioned regarding the effect of the
conversation on them, or request a cautionary instruction.
Further, when the record is viewed in context, it is
unmistakable that the exchange did not constitute "early
deliberation" in the sense contemplated by the court in State v.
Washington, 438 A.2d 1144 (Conn. 1979), relied upon
defendant.
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by

In Washington# the Connecticut Supreme Court found to
be error an express instruction given by the trial court to the
jurors that they could discuss the case during the course of the
trial so long as they did not take a vote or come to a
conclusion.

The court found that the instruction violated due

process in that it encouraged the jurors to give premature
consideration to the evidence prior to receiving the benefit of
jury instructions.

As a result of the instruction, the jurors

discussed the case each day in the jury room.

The court also

stated that not all juror discussion prior to deliberation
necessitates reversal because not every act of misconduct
warrants a new trial.
In the present case, the trial court did not instruct
the jury that they could discuss the matter prior to trial.

In

fact, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that they
could not discuss the matter with one another or any one else
prior to deliberations.
1031, 853.

See e.g., R. 1386, 1520, 1343, 1170-71,

The discussion that took place was during the course

of the cross-examination and is fully disclosed in the record; it
is clear that no impropriety occurred.
The jury did not "deliberate" as defendant contends.
Juror #6's question, when viewed in context, manifests that when
he asked the question he was not "committing himself to the
position that Bringhurst's inability to remember details was
inconsequential and thereby aligning himself with the state."
(Br. of App. at 61). Rather, the juror's question was in an
effort to clarify whether he would be obligated to remember all

details of the evidence presented.

When the court explained that

the jurors would collectively attempt to recall the evidence when
they deliberated at the end of the trial and that both counsel
would provide the jurors with an overview of the case during
closing argument, the juror responded that his question had been
directed to that concern (R. 1497), not to his concern about
Trooper Bringhurst being questioned about details he could not
remember.
As defendant acknowledges, the facts in the present
case are easily distinguished from State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277
(Utah 1985) in which this Court found reversible error because a
juror had conversed outside the courtroom with a state's witness.
This Court stated that any unauthorized contact between jurors
and witnesses, attorneys or court personnel raises a rebuttable
prejudice.
contact.

In the present case there was no unauthorized

Everything occurred in open court and on the record.

The concern that a juror might have been tainted by an
unauthorized interchange simply does not exist in this case.
The trial court has a certain amount of discretion to
allow questions from the jurors during the course of the trial.
In State v. Martinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958)
this Court stated that, while judges should not generally invite
questions, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court
to determine whether to allow unsolicited questions from jurors.
See also State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960).
While defendant correctly states the standard of review
for errors that rise to the level of a constitutional violation
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is whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v.
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987), in the present case, not only
was defendant's due process rights guaranteed by the United
States and Utah Constitutions not denied, there was no error.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL.
Relying upon standards set forth in State v. Leonard,
707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985), defendant asserts that the trial court
erred in failing to grant defense counsel's motion to withdraw
and motion for mistrial.

However, the facts of the present case

are distinguishable from those in Leonard; therefore, defendant's
reliance upon Leonard in the instant case is ill founded.
In Leonard, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial
after the jury was sworn but before any evidence was adduced so
that she could withdraw from the case in order to testify on
behalf of the defendant.

On review, this Court determined that

it was error on the part of the trial court to require the
defendant's counsel to continue to represent the defendant until
she actually testified, where upon the court would appoint cocounsel to examine defendant's counsel and argue her credibility
to the jury.

This Court held that defendant's counsel acted

appropriately and timely in seeking to withdraw prior to trial,
before having presented her theory of the case to the jury in
order to avoid raising the issue of her credibility.
In the present case, the defense counsel's motion to
withdraw or for a mistrial on the last day of the trial (R. 854),

after defense counsel's theory of the case had been presented to
the jury and her stake in the verdict made clear, was neither
appropriate or timely.

In effect, had the trial court granted

the motions in order to allow defense counsel to testify, it
would have confused the jury, raising the issue of defense
counsel's credibility by combining her role as defendant's
advocate with that of witness.

This danger was recognized by

this Court in Leonard:
It is widely recognized that the credibility
of an attorney who acts as a witness in his
client's case, as well as his effectiveness
as an attorney in that case, may be seriously
compromised. . . .
"It has been suggested
that once [counsel] becomes a witness his
personal credibility is placed at issue
before the jury and this may lessen his
effectiveness as an advocate. It has also
been indicated that his involvement as a
witness for his client causes him to be more
easily subject to impeachment for interest
and thus lessons his effectiveness as a
witness."
Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653 (citations omitted).
Because defense counsel's motions for withdrawal and
mistrial in the instant case were neither appropriate nor timely,
the trial court acted properly in denying them.

To have ruled

otherwise would have created a high potential for prejudicing the
jury's assessment of defendant's case by introducing the issue of
defense counsel's credibility.
Experience teaches that the roles of advocate
and witness should be separated. If an
attorney attempts to combine the two roles,
he is likely to be less effective in each
role. "That counsel should avoid appearing
both as advocate and witness except under
special circumstances is beyond question."
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Leonard, 707 P.2d at 653 (citations omitted).

The facts of the

present case simply fail to establish a "special circumstance"
sufficient to warrant defense counsel's motion to withdraw for
mistrial.
In Leonard, this Court determined that because defense
counsel's proffered testimony addressed the critical issue of the
defendant's actual guilt of the crime charged, the decision not
to grant defense counsel's motion to withdraw for mistrial
warranted reversal on the ground that, had the jury believed the
testimony of defendant's counsel, the jury may not have convicted
the defendant or it may have convicted the defendant of a lesser
crime.

However, because the proffered testimony of defense

counsel in the present matter cannot be characterized as critical
to the jury's decision, the trial court acted properly in denying
defense counsel's motions to withdraw and for mistrial.
Defense counsel asserts that her testimony was
necessary in order to rebut the testimony of Detective Imig of
the West Valley Police Department on the ground that his
testimony at trial regarding his relationship with defendant was
inconsistent with information he conveyed to defense counsel over
the telephone in January of 1987. However, the allegedly
inconsistent statements of Detective Imig (Br. of App. at 66-67)
concern only incidental or insignificant matters rather than
disputed issues in the case.

For example, a critical issue in

the present case concerns defendant's intent with reference to
the two weapons he had obtained on May 26. At trial, defendant
testified that three years earlier, Detective Imig had asked him

to acquire any illegal guns he came across for the officer (R.
953).

Defense counsel asserts that the purpose of defendant's

testimony was to establish that he, (1) did not know the guns
were loaded; (2) that he was not driving around looking for an
armed confrontation; and (3) did not intend to kill Trooper
Bringhurst.
The State offered Detective Imig's testimony in
rebuttal for the purpose of showing that although Detective Imig
and defendant had a working relationship in the past, that
relationship was terminated by Detective Imig's department in May
of 1985.

On cross-examination, Detective Imig conceded that he

had not directly informed defendant of the department's decision
to discontinue working with him; however he engaged in no further
transactions or conversations with defendant.

Defendant

contended that he acquired the two weapons for the purpose of
showing them to Detective Imig pursuant to their agreement of
three years past.

Given Detective Imig's concession, defense

counsel's testimony regarding the reason Detective Imig and
defendant did not meet at the White Horse Lounge in August or
September of 1985; and the exact number of times Detective Imig
met with defendant to discuss the purchase of illegal weapons,
addressed only incidental and insignificant matters.

Defense

counsel's proffered testimony did not reach a disputed issue.
Furthermore, defense counsel was able to make known to the jury
through her questioning of Detective Imig, which statements of
his she believed to be inconsistent and why (R. 846-47).
Therefore, defense counsel's proffered testimony in the instant
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case lacked probative value because it would have pertained to
collateral rather than disputed issues in the case, and because
defense counsel was able to point out the alleged inconsistencies
of Detective Imig's testimony to the jury.
An attorney who participates directly in interviewing a
witness subjects him or herself to the prospect of being a
witness at trial.

State v. Worthen, slip op. no. 20328 (Utah,

filed Aug. 23, 1988).

Defense counsel, without anyone else

present, interviewed Detective Imig.

Thus, she created this risk

of being a witness and invited the potential for error.

Because

the situation was created by the defense, and because defendant
was not prejudiced by the trial court's ruling, it was not error
to refuse defense counsel's request to withdraw or for a mistrial
in order to allow her to testify.

S=ee State v. Williams, 656

P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982).
In addition, defense counsel contends that the trial
court's denial of her motions to withdraw and for mistrial denied
defendant due process of law under the fourteenth amendment and
compulsory process pursuant to the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution.

Relying upon Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.

14 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court determined that
the fourteenth amendment due process clause and the sixth
amendment compulsory process clause were violated by a state law
which precluded a defendant from using a co-defendant as a
witness on his behalf, defense counsel asserts that a defendant's
right to present witnesses to establish a defense encompasses the
right to place on the witness stand any person in the courtroom

including a defendant's own attorney.

However, because defense

counsel's analysis of the Washington opinion excludes
consideration of the myriad of issues raised by an attorney
seeking withdrawal in order to testify on behalf of a client,
defense counsel's reliance upon Washington and Webb v. Texas, 409
U.S. 95 (1972) is inapposite to the case at hand.
Finally, the decision whether to grant defense
counsel's motions to withdraw and for mistrial in the instant
case, were for reasons set forth above, clearly within the sound
discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed unless
clear error or abuse is shown.

State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450,

453 (Utah 1982); State v. Doherty, 509 P.2d 351, 352 (Utah 1973);
People v. Ashton, 661 P.2d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 1982)
Similarly, in Watson v. District Court In And For
Fourth Judicial District, 604 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Colo. 1980), the
Court held that defense counsel has a heavy duty to insure that a
frivolous motion to withdraw is not made.

The Court stated that

"the trial court in considering [a defense counsel's] request for
withdrawal of counsel, will be in a position to properly weigh
the issue involved in light of the evidence presented. . . . "
Van Cott v. Wall, 53 Utah 282, 178 P. 42 (Utah 1919).

Accord,

Comden v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 576 P.2d 971, 974
(Cal. 1978) (when it is impractical to determine with certainty
whether an attorney ought to testify, the trial court ordinarily
must make a determination notwithstanding the uncertainty, as
delay in making a decision may prejudice the client).
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In the present case, the trial court had the
opportunity to consider the probative value of defense counsel's
proffered testimony and compare that value with the threat of
possible prejudice toward the defendant should defense counsel's
credibility be questioned.

Because defense counsel's proffered

testimony addressed only insignificant collateral matters, it was
unnecessary in order to rebut the alleged inconsistencies of
Detective Imig's testimony.

Therefore, the trial court acted

within the scope of its discretion in denying the Motion for New
Trial.
POINT X
BECAUSE NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED IN THIS
CASE, DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL
BASED UPON "CUMULATIVE ERROR."
Defendant requests that this Court reverse his
conviction for attempted murder on the basis of the cumulative
effect of the errors committed by the trial court.

Based upon

the foregoing discussion of defendant's allegations of error,
reversal of his conviction is not warranted on the theory of
cumulative error.

Because the trial court, at most, committed

harmless error, defendant's conviction should be affirmed.

See

State v. Rammell, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986); Hawkes v.
State, 644 P.2d 111, 133 (Okla. Crim. 1982); State v. McKenzie,
608 P.2d 428, 448 (Mont. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1050;
United States v. Bohr, 481 F.2d 1294, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 958.
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POINT XI
ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER CAN BE THE
UNDERLYING CRIME UPON WHICH A CHARGE
OF HABITUAL CRIMINAL CAN BE BASED.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing
the prosecution to charge defendant with being an habitual
criminal when the underlying or "triggering" offense is attempted
first degree murder.

Defendant provides no legal support for his

argument, aside from Solem v. Helmy 422 U.S. 277 (1983) which
holds that a term of life imprisonment following a conviction for
a $100 "no account" check was disproportionate in violation of
the eighth amendment.
The habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-81001 (1978) states:
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced and committed for felony offenses at
least one of which offenses having been at
least a felony of the second degree of a
crime which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony of
the first degree or felony of the second
degree, and was committed to any prison may,
upon conviction of at least a felony of the
second degree committed in this state, other
than murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
The statute provides that the triggering offense cannot
be murder in the first or second degree; the statute does not
preclude attempted murder in the first or second degree from
being the triggering offense.
This Court has previously stated that the language of
the habitual criminal statute is "clear and unambiguous."
v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983).

State

The language of the

statute precludes the use of first or second degree murder as
being the triggering offense; no where in the statute does the
language suggest that the legislature intended to include an
attempted murder within the ambit of that phrase.
The original habitual criminal statute was enacted in
1896; it contained language similar to the present statute:
"Whoever has been previously twice convicted of crime . . . shall
upon conviction of a felony committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree . . ." Utah Code Ann. 103-118 (1896) (emphasis added); State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1276, 1276
(Utah 1978).

The statute was amended in 1953 and retained the

language that states that the triggering offense must be "other
than murder in the first or second degree."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

1-18 (1953) (Laws of Utah, ch. 77, sec. 1); Carter, at 1276. The
statute was repealed in 1973 and the present statute was enacted
in 1975.

The legislative history is unclear as to the reason the

language in question, "other than murder in the first or second
degree," was contained in the original statute; the history is
also unclear as to why the language was maintained.
There may have been a reason for the language in 1896;
however, the reason, if any, no longer exists.

The purpose of

the habitual criminal statute is to subject persistent offenders
to more severe penalties.

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 207

(Utah 1987); State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983).
Because the language in question serves no purpose, and the
purpose of the statute is to provide greater sanctions for
persistent offenders, the statute should not be expanded to

include an attempt to commit murder in the first or second
degree.
If the legislative had intended that attempted murder
be included, it would have used that language, as it has done in
numerous other statues.

For example, in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-

102 (Supp. 1988), the legislature provided that when a defendant
is convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, the classification
of the offense is one degree lower.

However, when an attempt to

commit child kidnapping, or an attempt to commit a sexual offense
which is a first degree felony prohibited by part 4 of Chapter 5,
the attempt to commit the crime remains a first degree felony.
In Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-406 (Supp. 1988), the legislature
provided that probation could not be granted for certain offenses
and that is could not be granted for an attempt to commit some of
4
those offense.
See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (1978). In
Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-102 (Supp. 1988) states:
"Criminal attempt to commit (1) A capital
felony is a felony of the first degree; (2) A
felony of the first degree is a felony of the
second degree; except that an attempt to
commit child kidnaping, or to commit a
violation of Section 76-5-301.1 or to commit
any of those felonies described in part 4 of
Chapter 5 of this title which are felonies of
the first degree is a felony of the first
degree. . . .M
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-406(1) (Supp. 1988) states:
(1) Nothwithstanding Sections 76-3-201
and 77-18-1, and Chapter 16, Title 77, and
any other provision of law, except as
provided in Section 76-5-406.5, probation
shall not be granted, the execution or
imposition of sentence shall not be
suspended, the court shall not enter a
judgment for a lower category of offense, and

Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978) the legislature did not include
the language "attempt- and therefore attempted murder does not
fall within the exception, but rather is a "triggering" offense,
making defendant subject to prosecution under the statute.
Defendant's argument that he was punished more severely
for the attempt to commit the murder of Trooper Bringhurst than
he would have been if he had actually caused his death is without
merit.

Had defendant actually caused Bringhurst's death, he

would have been subject to either life imprisonment or, if given
the alternate penalty, to death for his crime.
The clear language of the statute does not include
"attempt" to commit murder in the first or second degree as being
excluded from the category of triggering offenses for the offense
of being an habitual criminal.

The language should not be

expanded to include an attempt.

Therefore, defendant was

properly charged and convicted of being an habitual criminal
following his charge and conviction with attempted murder in the
first degree.

Cont. hospitalization shall not be
ordered, the effect of which would in any way
shorten the prison sentence for any person
who commits a felony of the first degree
involving: child kidnaping, a violation of
Section 76-5-301.1; aggravated kidnaping, a
violation of Section 76-5-302; rape, a
violation of Section 76-5-402.1; any attempt
to commit rape of a child; object rape of a
child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; any
attempt to commit object rape of a child;
sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section
76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, a violation of Subsections 76-5404.1(3) and (4); or aggravated sexual
assault, a violation of Section 76-5-405.

POINT XII
DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL ON EACH
PRIOR CONVICTION AND HIS PLEAS ARE, THEREFORE,
PRESUMED VOLUNTARY.
During defendant's trial for being an habitual
criminal, Ralph Newberg, the records administrator for the Idaho
Department of Corrections, testified that he was personally
familiar with the defendant and that the records admitted as
State's Exhibit No. 1 (certified copies of the photograph,
fingerprint record, and commitment papers) pertained to defendant
(R. 617-18).

The documents reflected that defendant had been

convicted of burglary in the first degree, escape, a second
escape, and assault with a deadly weapon (which Mr. Newberg
testified occurred during the course of the latter escape) (R.
620-23).

The documents also reflect, as conceded by defendant

(Br. of App. at 75), that defendant was represented by counsel
during each proceeding (See Exhibit B).
At trial, defendant did not testify and presented no
evidence, relying on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the elements of the habitual criminal offense.
The documents show that defendant was represented by
counsel during the proceedings resulting in all prior
convictions.

Because defendant was represented by counsel in

each case, and the representation was clearly made part of the
record, the State was entitled to a presumption that defendant
had voluntarily entered his guilty pleas.

State v. Branch, 743

P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1987); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 743
(Utah 1985); Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 640, 640, n. 1 (citing
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Guqlielmetti v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 341, 496 P.2d 261 (1972) (when
defendant is represented by counsel, this Court will deem the
plea to be voluntary)).

In Branch, the State introduced

commitment documents which showed that the defendant had been
represented by counsel at the time he had entered two of three
guilty pleas

upon which the State relied in proving the offense

of being an habitual criminal.

This Court stated:

The State demonstrated that both pleas were
entered with the benefit of counsel. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence demonstrating the pleas were involuntary, the pleas
are presumed to have been voluntary (citing
Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 610, 641 (Utah
1982)). A defendant can overcome this
presumption by presenting to the trial court
some evidence of involuntariness, thus
shifting back to the State the burden of
demonstrating voluntariness. The defendant
is the party who can most readily demonstrate that the pleas were involuntarily
made if they indeed were; it therefore
seems unreasonable to impose upon the State
the duty of showing not only that the pleas
were made with adequate counsel but also that
the pleas were no involuntary.
Id. at 1192-93.
Defendant presented no evidence, however slight, that
his pleas were not voluntary*

Because he was represented by

counsel during each prior proceeding resulting in convictions
relied upon by the State, the pleas are presumed to have been
voluntary, absent any evidence to the contrary.

The judgments

were constitutionally sufficient under both the United States and
Utah Constitutions.

Defendant's conviction for being an habitual

criminal should be affirmed.
Defendant's plea affidavit was admitted to show the
voluntariness of the third plea.
-81-

POINT XIII
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE SUFFICIENT
TO INVOKE THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL PROVISION.
The habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. S 76-81001 (1978) states:
Any person who has been twice convicted,
committed, sentenced, and committed for felony
offenses at least one of which offenses having
been a felony of the second degree or a crime,
which, if committed within this state would
have been a capital felony, felony of the
first degree or felony of the second degree,
and was committed to any prison may, upon
conviction of at least a felony of the second
degree committed in this state, other than
murder in the first or second degree, be
determined as a habitual criminal and be
imprisoned in the state prison for from five
years to life.
(Emphasis added.)
According to the statute, only one prior conviction
need be at least a second degree felony.

The other conviction

used to establish the charge, can be a felony in any degree.
Additionally, the language of the statute uses the
disjunctive term "or" between the two phrases regarding the prior
convictions.

As a result, the first portion of the statute

(twice convicted "for felony offenses at least one of which
offenses having been at least a felony of the second degree")
appears to focus upon the state in which the conviction occurred
for the determination of the degree of the felony.

The second

portion of that phrase ("or a crime which, if committed within
this state, would have been a capital felony, felony of the first
degree or felony of the second degree. . .") relies upon the Utah
law for a determination of the degree of the felony.
Ann. §76-8-1001 (1978) (emphasis added).

Utah Code

Defendant's prior convictions were more than sufficient
to establish the requisite number and degree of felony to
establish foundation for the habitual criminal conviction.
Defendant's convictions were as follows:
1.

Burglary in the first degree, a felony which

carried a term of imprisonment of not less than one nor more than
five years (R. 620, Exhibit 1 (See Appendix B)).
2.

Escape, a felony which carried a term of

imprisonment not to exceed two years (R. 621, Exhibit 1 (See
Appendix B)).

Mr. Newberg stated that the escape was from the

Idaho prison (R. 621).
3.

Escape, which carried a term of imprisonment not to

exceed five years (R. 622, Exhibit 1 (See Appendix B)).

Again,

the escape was from a correction's department facility (R. 622).
4.

Assault with a deadly weapon, which carried a term

of imprisonment not to exceed two years (R. 622-23, Exhibit 1
(See Appendix B)).
The second escape and the assault with a deadly weapon
occurred at the time but were separate convictions.

The State

and defendant are in agreement that the assault, if committed in
Utah, would be a third degree felony (Br. of App. at 83).
Any one of defendant's first three convictions are
sufficient to establish the requisite second degree felony.
Idaho, the burglary was a felony in the first degree.

In

Under the

first portion of the statute, which focuses on the convicting
state for a determination of the degree of the felony, the
conviction is sufficient to constitute at least a felony of the
second degree.

Either or both of the escapes would constitute a second
degree felony if committed within the State of Utah.

The Utah

escape statute, Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-309 (1978) states, in
relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes
from official custody.
(2) The offense is a felony of the second
degree if:
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly
weapon against any person to effect the
escape; or
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the
state prison. Otherwise, escape is a class
B misdemeanor.
(3) . . . For purposes of this section, a
person is deemed to be confined in the Utah
state prison if he has been sentenced and
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parol.
Defendant's first escape conviction arose from an escape from the
Idaho prison.

The second escape was also from a prison facility;

additionally, he used a deadly weapon during the course of the
escape.

Therefore, under either subsection (a) or (b) of the

escape statute, the crime would constitute a second decree
felony.

Thus, either escape charge would be sufficient to

establish the requisite second degree felony.
Additionally, defendant was convicted of assault with a
deadly weapon, which would be a third degree felony if committed
within the State of Utah.

This felony, or any one of the above

convictions which did not serve to establish the requisite second
degree felony, could serve as the second felony to establish that
the defendant had "been twice convicted."
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If this Court were not to construe the first portion of
the Utah habitual criminal statute (as set-forth above) to rely
upon the convicting state for the determination of the degree of
the felony, and were instead to focus solely on whether the
burglary would have been a second degree felony if committed in
Utah, this Court would likely find that the crime would not
constitute a felony if committed in Utah.

Defendant was

convicted of a vehicle burglary; the crime if committed in Utah
would be a class A misdemeanor.

If this Court rejects the

State's interpretation of the statute and the disjunctive "or" in
the portion of the statute addressing the prior convictions,
defendant's burglary conviction could not be used as one of the
prior felony convictions providing foundation for the habitual
criminal charge.
Nevertheless, even if the burglary were totally
disregarded, the evidence is still more than sufficient to
establish the requisite offenses.

Either escape would constitute

the second degree felony; the other escape or the assault with a
deadly weapon would suffice to establish the other felony
conviction required.
Defendant's argument that this Court should look beyond
the escape convictions and focus on why defendant was
incarcerated in the prison in the first place is without merit.
Defendant was committed for a first degree felony burglary under
Idaho law.

This Court should not second guess whether the facts

of defendant's crime and the facts known to the judge at the time
of sentencing were sufficiently egregious as to justify

imprisonment.

Defendant admits that he escaped from the Idaho

prison and an adjacent prison facility (Br. of App. at 85).
There can be no doubt that his prior convictions were sufficient
to justify the invocation of Utah's habitual criminal provision.
Defendant's argument that he is not the type of
offender for which the habitual criminal statute was enacted is
equally without merit.

The record reflects that the four Idaho

convictions which the State used for the habitual criminal charge
were not his only prior convictions (R. 1524).

Regardless, even

the prior convictions used to establish the habitual criminal
conviction show that defendant is precisely the type of offender
for whom the habitual criminal statute was enacted.
The trial court did not err in finding that defendant
had previously been convicted on two occasions for felony
offenses, one of which was at least a felony of the second
degree.

His conviction for being an habitual criminal should be

affirmed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Defendant, Danny Lee Johnson, received a fair trial and
was properly convicted of attempted criminal homicide—murder in
the first degree of being an habitual criminal.

For the

Reference was made to defendant's prior convictions during the
hearing on whether to allow all prior convictions for impeachment
purposes (R. 1524). Additional information was given the trial
court at the time of sentencing (R. 596-97).
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Qi
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SO/"1

any concerns regarding his condition?
A.

I had some concerns regarding his condition.

There was obviously some pain, the bandages, so on.
Q

That's my question.

What specifically were

your concerns?
A.

Just his general condition, physical and mental.

Q

You said he was in a lot of pain?

K

He appeared to be.

QL

And what was his demeanor when you questioned

10 I him regarding the events?
11 J

A.

Well, his demeanor changed periodically throughout

the questioning, but I would describe it as somewhat active
and hyper, wanting to tell his story.
QL

Was he also excitable?

K

Yes.

Qi

And was this one of the reasons that you were

concerned about talking to him?
k

Yes.

0

Did you believe that he understood or were

20 I you able to perceive whether or not he understood your
21
22
2J

questions?
K

There were some that I don't think he understood

precisely, but for the most part, yes.

24

0

Did you have any problem understanding what

25

he was saying?
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1
2
3

A.
ft

No.
And you made a determination at that time then

to ask him questions and interview him?

4 I

k

5

Qi

You began the interview at 9:30?

6

A.

T h a t f s approximately when it started.

7

ft

I I
9
10

Yes.

And where were you?
A.

We were at LDS Hospital in his room.

have to guess.

I believe it was the fifth floor.

I would
I don't

recall the room number actually.

H

QL

Was he in intensive care unit?

12

A.

No.

I believe it was, I think they call it

13

it's not intensive care but it's a close-watch type of

14

ward where there are more nurses than a normal ward.

15

Qi

16

patient care?

17

A.

18

ft

19
20
21

24
25

So the next step down from ICU before regular

As I understand that particular ward.
Who was present?

A.

Trooper Bringhurst's wife and I believe one

of his children.
ft

22
23

—

Was anyone else present?
A.

Many people came and went throughout the intervie(w

but as far as anyone being there or participating, no.
ft

And how long were you present approximately?
A.

With Dennis that day or for the actual

—
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Qi

That morning for the interview.

K

In the interview, two, two and a half hours.

ft

And how long —

well, let me ask you this.

Did you tape the interview?
K

Yes, I did.

Qi

And approximately how long is that tape?

K

Approximately 90 minutes.

Qi

Did you stay and have lunch that day with

Trooper Bringhurst?
10 I

A.

No.

11

Qi

You did have lunch with Trooper Bringhurst?

12

A.

Yes.

13

ft

15
16

ft

19

There are portions —

A.

have you had an opportunity

No, I have not.

I have had an opportunity

to review the —
ft
K

20
21

No.

to review the tape?

17
IS

And that was not in the hospital on that day?
K

14

I left and had lunch with Trooper Bringhurst]

ft

—

transcript.

—

the transcript of the tape.

Okay.

And in that, let me ask you this.

22

that transcript a true and accurate reflection of your

23

conversation with Trooper Bringhurst as you recall it?
K

24
2$

yes.

Is

As I recall the conversation of the interview,

I have not had an opportunity to listen to the tape
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and read verbatim as it was transcribed.
Qt

But you have reviewed the tape. As far as you

know, is it accurate?
K

Yes.

QL

And in fact, the —

A.

Secretary to Commissioner Badraro, Holly Eales.

QL

And she's a highly reliable and trusted typist;

who taped the tape?

is that not true?
k

Yes.

ft

During the course of the transcription there

are points which indicate that the type is turned off;
is that right?
k

Yes.

QL

Would you please tell the jury, as far as you

recall, what those reasons were for turning the tape off?
A.

There were times when I felt it necessary to

give Trooper Bringhurst a rest.

There were interruptions

from visitors, people coming into the room, which I didn't
feel like they should participate or be present.

Those

are basically the reasons.
ft

Were there any medical personnel?

k

I believe there was a nurse, and I even recall

a doctor, I think, came in but that is not positive.
ft

Okay.

So the tape was —

turned off, it was not —

when the tape was

there is no other conversation
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that you had regarding this incident that is not on the
tape?
A.

No.

The ~

there was no conversation pursuant

to the incident that was not on the tape recorder.
ft

During the interview what —

we know what the

purpose is for, but what are you trying to do when you
ask him certain questions?

Are you trying to get the detail^

A.

I am trying to get details, yes.

ft

Now, I asked you to review the transcript and

10 I directed you to certain parts; is that right?
11 I

A.

Yes.

ft

And we went over those parts, those pertinent

parts, yesterday in the County Attorney's Office; is that
correct?
A.

Yes, ma'am.

ft

With the county attorney present.

A.

Yes, ma'am.

ft

I am going to direct your attention first of

all to page 7.

I am going to direct you down three-quarters

20 I of the page, I believe you and the prosecutor have those
21

parts marked, and ask you if you asked the question to

22

Trooper Bringhurst, okay, to what would you estimate his

23

speed?
K

24
25

Did you ask him that question?

ft

Yes.
And was his answer basically that making the
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1

left turn and going up Third West never over five miles

2

an hour?

3

A.

Yes.

4

ft

I am going to direct your attention to page

5

1 of the transcript. Let me ask you this before we go over

6

there.

7

Third West proper, am I correct?

8

he's talking about speed?

9
10
11

On the five miles an hour, he's describing the

k

No.

Third West road when

We're describing the general area.

Are

you indicating there, his statement there?
ft

No.

I am indicating his answer.

Making the

12

left turn and going up Third West never over five miles

13

per hour.

14
15

A.

We're describing the overall area of the

intersection of 13th and Third West.

16

ft

But he said going up Third West; is that right?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

ft

I am sorry.

Now back to page 1.

On that page

19

I directed you to a portion. Have you had a chance to review

20

that portion?

21

K

Yes, ma'am.

22

ft

And as far as this portion where he's talking,

23

was that in response to a question that you asked?

24

K

25

ft

No.
He at this point then is just relating his story?
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K

1
2

ft

Yes.
And this is at the beginning of the interview;

3

is that right?

4

K

Yes.

5

&

Did he, in his story, ask you or say, the subject}

6

looked at the officer and then without checking traffic

7

or anything, just made the turn?
K

t I
9

I started up to where we highlighted.

trying to get down to the portion.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

Seventh line down?

12

ft

15

Yes.
K

U
14

I am

ft

Would you repeat?
Yes.

Did he say

MS. KNIGHT-EGAN:

—
Your Honor, I will object

16

to the leading form of the questions.

17

MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, in order for me

18

to direct him to the pertinent parts that are at issue

19

here, I have to lead him.

20

which I believe is admissible.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. PALACIOS:

21

THE COURT:

24
2$

It f s a preliminary question

Is that numbered or is it not numbered?
It's my numbering.

I mean the transcript —

oh, it's

not numbered by line.
MS. KNIGHT-EGAN:

Your Honor, the page numbers

are numbered on the transcript.

THE COURT:

The lines are not numbered though.

MS. KNIGHT-EGAN:
THE COURT:

The lines are not numbered.

She may have to lead to get him

to the right question.
MS. PALACIOS:
ft

Thank you, your Honor.

I am going to ask you, did he say "at you,"

the subject looked at you, the officer, and then at you
without checking traffic

or anything, just made the turn?

K

Yes.

ft

Now, he's describing being at what point when

this happens?
A.

Where is he?

Okay.

That particular question I need to read

above that to make a determination of what exactly, because
I can't mix the sentences up.

If you will bear with me,

I will read it then I can answer your question.
ft

Okay.

A.

Okay.

That particular question would be in

regards to the 13th South offramp from the Interstate 15
collector system.
20 I

ft

Okay.

Thank you.

Page 10.

Begin about three-

21

fourths down where I marked it for you.

22

what position are your beams in on your car, headlights?
K

21
24
25

ft

Did you ask him

Yes.
And did he answer, I think low beam, I am not

sure?
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UCU^

A.

Yes.

&

Page 21. Again, to that portion of the testimony

did you ask him, "Now, what relate the police officer you
saw"?
A.

"Now, what relate the police officer that you

ft

That you saw?

K

Yes.

a

And what were you asking him there?

10

K

May I again refer?

11

a

Yes, if you need to review.

12

K

Okay.

saw."

13

That was a situation as the police officer

was goin g by in pursuit.

14

a

The police officer, meaning Evans?

15

K

I don't know which police officer.

16
17
18
19

A Salt

Lake City police officer.

a

And you were asking him where he was when the

officer went by?
K

I was asking him as I am referring back up

20

to the top of the page, wanting to know where he was and

21

what he was doing.

22
21

&

Where had he gotten to at that point.

And what was his answer when you asked him

where he was when the officer was in pursuit?

24

K

His car.

25

0

His answer was that he was in his car?
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A.

That was the impression I had of his answer.

I am going to have to read to give you the exact response.
0

Okay.

What was his exact response?

Again,

I am referring to that portion on page 21.
A>

Okay.

You're asking me to read the statement

that he made to me?
Q,

Yes.

Where he asked him, "Now, what relate

the police officer that you saw/1 what was his statement?
K

"He went past as the car was speeding away.

10 I I don't recall if I was in my car —
11

I don't remember.w

sitting in my car.

12

&

Thank you.

13

Did you ask him:

14

your mind"?

yes, I think I was

Page 8.

The bottom of the page.

"Try to recollect what was going through

15

A.

Yes.

16

&

And was his answer "Nothing.

17

If anything,

I was probably cocky, I was sure I had a drunk"?

18

A.

Yes.

19

&

Page 9:

Do you recall asking him whether or

20

not he used his flashlight into the rear view mirror of

21

Mr. Johnson's vehicle ?
K

22
21

did he use his flashlight in the mirror.

24
25

I don't recall asking him that specific question,]

Q

Do you recall him giving you information regarding

that?
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K

Yes.

QL

And what did he tell you as to whether or not

his flashlight hit onto the rear view mirror?
A.

Are you asking me to read the statement that

he gave at the bottom?
QL

Y O U can read the statement or if you recall,

you an answer.
A.

Yes.

I would prefer to just read his statement.

"No," and he didn't.

I wasn't watching his eyes to see

any more because I had already had eye contact with him
and I wasn't watching his eyes any more in the mirror to
see if he was watching me keeping contact on me, but I
did hit him —
QL

hit his mirror with my flashlight."

So he did say "but I did hit his mirror with

my flashlight"?
k

Yes.

QL

And then on page 15 again with respect to the

flashlight.

Did he ever at any point tell you that in

fact he did not use his flashlight?
20 J

A.

Not that —

not as I recall.

21

Q.

I am going to direct you to the portion

22

let me count it.

23

if that refreshes your recollection.

—

Nine and ask you to read that and see

24

K

Now, this is my statement or Trooper Bringhurst'

2$

QL

Bringhurst'S statement.
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A.

"I think it was in my right hand at this time.

Probably changed over when I closed the car door.

Walked

up like this and hit him in the face right there and didn't
have it.

As a matter of fact, the street was so light

and everything, I didn't even have my flashlight in his
car."
Qi

Okay.

As far as you could tell, was he able

to actually tell you for sure whether or not he was using
the flashlight?
10 I

k

I don't understand your question.

11 I

Qt

Was he —

answer?

what was your impression in this

Was it that he in fact used the flashlight or

that he did not use the flashlight?
A*

My impression was that he was concerned over

the possibility of remembering if he had his flashlight
and in which hand he had it in.

He had his flashlight

with him but it was the hand he was concerned with.

That

was my impression, which hand he was using.
Qi

But was it ever clear to you whether or not

20 I he had it or not?
21

A.

It was never a question to me as to whether

22

he didn't or not —

23

in his hand, that's as I —

24
25

QL

didn't or didn't have it.

I don't mean to confuse you.

He had it

My question is

with respect to whether or not he actually shone the light
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in the rear view mirror, was there ever —

were you able

to determine whether or not that was true or not?
K

My impression is that that was true, that he

did in fact use the flashlight in the mirror.

a

Okay.

Again, on that same page, did you ask

him about how close he was to the vehicle?
K

Yes.

a

And what did you ask him?

A.

Well, we would have to back up to get to the

beginning of the actual questioning in that regard.

a

Let me ask you this.

Have you had a chance

to review that portion?
K

Yes.

a

And in that portion of questions, are you asking

him how close he was to the car?
A.

Yes.

o

Does Bringhurst then say, "I wasn't any closer

to the car than I am to that," page 15?
K
20
21
22

I have it.

I am trying to find out because

you r secreitary hasn't highlighted that portion to that.

a

It's just above —

do you want me to show you?

May I approach him, your Honor?

23

THE COURT:

Yes, you may do so.

24

a

(By Ms. Palacios)

25

K

Yes.

Did he say that?

515 J

ft

And when he said that, what was he referring

k

I believe he was referring to the hospital

to?

bed stand which can go across the bed for serving meals
and so on.
ft

And did you then respond to him, "Okay, you're

standing about 18 inches away offset on about a 45-degree
angle"?
K

Yes.

Qi

And did he respond, "Yeah, right there"?

K

Yes.

ft

And when he said, "Yeah, right there," did

he mention or do anything else?
A.

He was indicating that that —

the statement

that I had made would be about right in relation to that
tray.
Qi

Page 23.

Directing your attention to the portiorj

I asked you to review.

Did you ask Trooper Bringhurst,

"Was anyone attending to you at all, the city policemen?"
K

Yes.

ft

And did he answer, "No.

I think at some time

22 I I started for my trunk to get a compress because my keys
23

were in the trunk.

24

compress to stop the bleeding, but I don't remember"?

25

K

I think I went back there to get a

Your question was did he say that?
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a

Yes.

k

Yes.

ft

Now, when you interviewed and questioned

Trooper Bringhurst, he tried very hard to answer those
questions; is that correct?
k

Yes.

ft

And when he could not recall, he would say

that he could not recall; is that right?
k

He said on some occasions that something to

10 I the effect that, "I just can't remember."
111

ft

12
13

A.
ft

And he was anxious to tell you what happened?
Yes.
And was he stressed because of the questioning

14

itself?

15

k

16 I

Yes.
MS. PALACIOS:

That's all I have.

17
1* I
19
20

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. KNIGHT-EGAN:
ft

Lt. Fallows, you have described somewhat of

21

Trooper Bringhurst1s condition as you met with him in the

22

hospital on the 28th; is that correct?

k

23 I
24
25

ft

Yes.
What did you see about him that led you to

believe he was in pain?
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APPENDIX B

.5U Rev. Statutes, Sec. 906: Attestation by Legal Keeper of Records with Certificate
eal attached) of Secretary of State of official capacity of said Legal Keeper.)
ATE OF IDAHO

)

UNTY OF ADA

)

I, Ralph D. Newberg, do hereby certify: That I am the Records Administrator for the
aho State Correctional Institution, situated in the county and state aforesaid; that ir
legal custody as such officer are the original files and records of persons heretofore
emitted to said penal institution; that the:
—(1)

photograph
_ J 4 ) parole agreement

J J (2) fingerprint record
(5) report of violation

jg (3) commitment
(6) warrant of arrest

tached hereto are copies of the original records of H A V W T T F .TOHKSOV y / n . m
t
person heretofore committed to said penal institution and who served a term of imprisorit therein; that I have compared the foregoing and attached copies with their respective
iginais now on file in my office and each thereof contains, and is a full, true and
•rect transcript and copy from its said original.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
>., 19 86 .

30th

d$y of May

,

//
<*S/V(A'<'$
Ralph Dnfev/berg
Records Administrator

IDAHO STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION RECORD
PHOTOGRAPH

FINGERPRINT RECORD

( 1)

(2 )

TE OF IDAHO

COMMITMENT

(3 >

)
)

NTY OF ADA

)

I, Pete T. Cenarrusa, Secretary of State of Idaho, do hereby certify that Ralph D.
berg, whose name is subscribed to the above certificate, was at the date thereof, ar.d is
, the Records Administrator and is the Legal Keeper and the officer having the legal
tody of the original records of said Idaho State Correctional Institution; that the said
:ificate is in due form; and that the signature subscribed thereon is his genuine
lature.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto subscribed my jwae.and affixed the Seal of the
:e of IdahfiAtjijs w h day of
Ma• ff^^-Tt 86 .
Pete T. Cenarrusa
Secretary of State of Idaho
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